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Lifestyles of the Not-So-Rich or Famous: 
The Role of Choice and Sacrifice in 
Bankruptcy 
A MECHELE DICKERSONt 
INTRODUCTION 
Bankruptcy courts have yet to articulate a cohesive stan-
dard that governs whether debtors should be allowed to make 
lifestyle choices that harm creditors but do not appear to be nec-
essary. Any expenditure a debtor makes arguably harms some 
creditors, at least in the short-term. Thus, courts constantly are 
forced to decide whether expenditures should be allowed or de-
nied because they "abuse" the spirit (or letter) of bankruptcy 
laws. Unfortunately, neither debtors nor creditors reasonably 
can predict whether any given court will permit a particular 
lifestyle choice because courts have not stated what types of ac-
tivities categorically should be denied when a person files for 
bankruptcy. 
"Lifestyle," as discussed in this Article, means any choice 
that yields an act or expenditure that economically harms credi-
tors.1 Because the Code provides no objective standard for courts 
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1. If a lifestyle choice does not cause economic detriment to creditors, the choice 
should be allowed even if it offends a creditor's moral sensibilities. Likewise, if a lifestyle 
choice financially harms creditors, but denying the choice would not economically benefit 
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to apply when deciding which lifestyle choices debtors should be 
allowed to make, courts rely on vague, undefined concepts. For 
example, when examining proposed expenditures included in a 
Chapter 13 budget, courts must decide if those choices are "rea-
sonably necessary."2 Similarly, when deciding whether to force 
debtors to sacrifice a lifestyle choice in return for discharging an 
otherwise nondischargeable debt, courts ask whether the sacri-
fice would constitute an "undue hardship."3 Likewise, when de-
ciding whether a prior or proposed lifestyle choice indicates that 
a debtor is not entitled to a Chapter 7 discharge, courts question 
whether the debtor filed the petition in "good faith" or whether 
granting the petition would be a "substantial abuse" of the 
Code.4 · 
Courts and commentators have formulated tests to deter-
mine whether a particular expenditure is warranted in a partic-
ular case.5 However, neither Congress, courts, nor scholarly 
commentators have developed a normative standard that speci-
fies the types of lifestyle choices courts categorically should deny 
when a person chooses to file for protection under federal bank-
ruptcy laws. Although deciding lifestyle issues on a case-by-case 
basis may have some merit, 6 this ad hoc approach causes courts 
to approve some lifestyle choices that do not further bank-
ruptcy's dual policy considerations of protecting debtors' right to 
a fresh start yet ensuring that creditors' debts are repaid. 7 Con-
versely, a case-by-case approach allows courts to disapprove 
choices that are consistent with those policy considerations.8 De-
ciding these issues on a case-by-case basis also increases overall 
bankruptcy costs to both debtors and creditors since both groups 
are forced to litigate disputes that easily could be avoided if the 
creditors, the choice should be allowed even if it relates to non-necessary items. See dis-
cussion infra Parts ill.B.3 and ill.B.7. 
2. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (1994) (defining items included in Chapter 13 budget); 
see also discussion infra Parts ill.A.l and ill.B.1. 
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994) (defining student loan hardship discharge); see 
also discussion infra Part ill.B.3. 
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994); see also discussion infra Parts ill.A.3 and ill.B.2. 
5. See, e.g., Irving A Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies: 
Chapter 7 Dismissal on the Basis of "Substantial Abuse," 5 JL. & CoM. 1 (1984); Kath-
leen M. Cerne, Honor thy Creditors?: The Religious Debtor's Constitutional Conflict with 
Section 1325(b), 98 Co!IL L.J. 257 (1993); James Rodenberg, Comment, Reasonably Neces-
sary Expenses or Life of Riley?: The Disposable Income Test and a Chapter 13 Debtor's 
Lifestyle, 56 Mo. L. REv. 617 (1991). 
6. See Oliver B. Pollak, "Be Just Before You're Generous": Tithing and Charitable 
Contributions in Bankruptcy, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 527, 529 n.8 (1996). 
7. See discussion infra Part I. 
8. See discussion infra Part ill.B.6. 
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parties could refer to objective standards.9 
Moreover, the inconsistent, ad hoc, treatment bankruptcy 
courts have given lifestyle issues fuels the public's perception 
that bankruptcy has no social consequences. Some of this per-
ceived "abuse" can be attributed to the public's general misun-
derstanding of a debtor's right to keep some of her property, yet 
completely avoid repaying most' debts.10 Other perceptions can-
not be dismissed so easily.11 Indeed, until bankruptcy courts de-
velop a consistent, rational framework for analyzing lifestyle 
choices, both creditors and the public will remain confused by, 
and disgusted with, a debtor's apparent right to abuse bank-
ruptcy laws.12 
This Article examines courts' treatment of lifestyle issues 
involving consumer debtorf?.13 I argue that courts should not per-
9. See generally Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlement, and 
the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 866-68 (1982) (discussing role that clear and 
determinable bankruptcy rules have on lowering credit costs in non-bankruptcy 
settings). 
10. See Lowell P. Bottrell, Comfortable Beds, A Church Pew, A Cemetery Lot, One 
Hog, One Pig, Six Sheep, One Cow, A Yolk of Oxen or a Horse, and Your Notary Seal: 
Some Thoughts About Exemptions, 72 N.D. L. REv. 83, 83 (1996) (observing that state 
law exemptions "may perplex the average individual because it seems strange that the 
debtor may keep a home worth several thousand dollars yet they cannot keep the $200 
or $300 cash they have in their checking accounts"). 
11. See Gene Tharpe, Going for Broke, Bankruptcy Filings At Record Levels: With 
Consumer Debt Spiraling Upward, More Individuals in Over Their Heads Are Turning to 
This Legal Remedy, Which No Longer Seems to Carry a Significant Social Stigma, AT-
LANTA J. & CoNST., Sept. 23, 1996, at E1. Noting that bankruptcies are approaching one 
million annually, Sam Gerdano, director of the American Bankruptcy Institute, com-
mented that people view bankruptcy "as no big deal ... and surely not the socially stig-
matizing action it was in the past . • . . They no longer see bankruptcy as only for 
deadbeats and, for many in financial trouble, it's becoming more of a first option rather 
than a last option." ld. 
See also Cary Spivak & Douglas Armstrong, Accused of $41 Million Fraud Bankrupt 
Yet Living the High Life Cattleman Manages to Control Much of What He's Lost, MILWAU-
KEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 5, 1996, at 1. Describing a debtor with over $41 million in debt 
who continues to live in a $221,000 home, one creditor mused, "Something is not right. 
rm really beginning to wonder about the justice system." ld. 
12. Going for Broke, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 28, 1996, at A10 ("Easy access to credit, 
coupled with the acquisitive values of a consumer society, have contributed not only to 
the financial downfall of an increasing number of households but also to the abuse of the 
bankruptcy law."). 
13. There is also a perception that corporate debtors abuse bankruptcy laws. See 
generally KEVIN J. DELAYEN, STRATEGIC BANKRUPI'CY: How CORPORATIONS AND CREDITORS 
USE CHAPI'ER 11 TO THEIR ADVANTAGE (1992). However, this Article focuses solely on con-
sumers' lifestyle choices. Presenting an analytical framework that addresses both indi-
vidual and business lifestyle issues is beyond the scope of this Article because most pol-
icy considerations that justify the need for corporate reorganizations simply are not 
present in consumer filings. See Elizabeth Warren, Essay, Bankruptcy Policymaking in 
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mit debtors to make lifestyle choices that prejudice creditors-
even when the choice seems noble-unless the choice provides 
tangible, necessary, economic benefits to the debtors. Courts 
should allow choices that detrimentally affect creditors but pro-
vide no tangible, necessary, economic benefits to the debtor only 
if those choices are required by applicable state or federal law.14 
Thus, if the Code clearly specfiies how courts should treat a par-
ticular lifestyle issue, courts must apply the literal language of 
the Code-even if doing so produces a result the court views as 
"distasteful."15 Only where tl_le Code is unclear should courts 
evaluate lifestyle choices based on the economic effect the 
choices have on debtors and their creditors. 
I. GoALS AND POLICIES. OF BANKRUPTCY 
Bankruptcy is designed to help financially distressed indi-
viduals and businesses either liquidate their assets and dis-
charge their debts, or restructure and repay some of their debts. 
The Bankruptcy Code16 is governed by two conflicting policy con-
siderations: providing a fresh start to honest debtors and pro-
tecting the rights of creditors.17 
an Imperfect World, 92 MicH. L. REv. 336, 341 (1993). 
14. For example, if a debtor is legally obligated to provide financial support to her 
adult (but mentally disabled) child, this expenditure must be allowed even though the 
debtor derives no direct tangible, economic benefit from the expenditure. 
15. See discussion infra notes 155-156. 
16. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11 US.C. and 28 US.C.); Bankruptcy Judges, United 
States Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 
Stat. 3114 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 US. C. and 29 US.C.); Retiree 
Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stat. 610 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 11 US.C.); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
11 US.C.); Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, 104 Stat. 2865 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 US.C.); Criminal Control Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 
US.C.); Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 11 US.C. and 28 US.C.); Treasury, Postal Service 
and General Government Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-509, 104 Stat. 1389 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 US.C.); Department of Commerce, Justice, and 
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
121, 107 Stat. 1153 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 US. C.); Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified in scattered sections of 
11 US.C., 18 US.C., and 28 US.C.). 
17. This Article does not purport to analyze the validity of, or the weight that 
should be given to, either policy objective. The standard proposed in this Article does not 
favor one policy over the other nor does it radically shift the balance of rights from debt-
ors to creditors. Moreover, most of the lifestyle choices courts have permitted, but should 
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The fresh start policy is designed both to relieve the honest 
debtor of the burden of repaying debts and to give the debtor 
enough assets to reestablish himself as a productive, responsi-
ble, debt-paying member of society.18 Consumer debtors can 
avoid repaying their debts and receive a fresh start by filing for 
relief under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of the Code.19 
The second bankruptcy policy protects creditors by facilitat-
ing the orderly repayment of debts.20 The main protections the 
Code gives creditors are consolidating the debtor's assets into an 
estate, 21 imposing an automatic stay of virtually all collection 
activities,22 and ensuring that similarly situated creditors are 
treated equally.23 The automatic stay primarily protects the 
debtor by preventing creditors from dismantling the estate. By 
curtailing collection activities, however, the stay also protects 
have denied, directly benefit third-parties (non-dependent family members and religious 
organizations) who are not creditors. See discussion infra Parts III.B.1 and III.B.5. 
18. The fresh start policy gives "the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders 
for distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity 
in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discourage-
ment of pre-existing debt." Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (emphasis in 
original). 
19. While Chapter 11 primarily is used by businesses seeking to reorganize their 
debts, consumer debtors also can file and receive a discharge under Chapter 11. Toibb v:. 
Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991). Indeed, if an individual does not have "regular in-
come," and has unsecured debt that exceeds $250,000 or secured debt that exceeds 
$750,000, she cannot file for relief under Chapter 13. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1994). Instead, 
she can restructure and repay her debts only by filing for relief under Chapter 11. 11 
U.S.C. § 109(d) (1994). Because the overwhelming majority of cases involving lifestyle 
choices are Chapter 7 and 13 filings, this Article focuses on those two chapters. Nonethe-
less, courts examining lifestyle choices in individual Chapter 11 cases should also bal-
ance the economic benefits the choices give debtors against the economic impact the 
choices have on creditors. 
20. H. R REP. No. 95-595, at 366-68 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6321-24. Because the fresh start policy ensures that debtors shield some of their prop-
erty from creditors, these two goals frequently are at odds. See, e.g., David S. Cartee, 
Comment, Surrendering Collateral Under Section 1329: Can the Debtor Have Her Cake 
and Eat It Too?, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 501, 502 (1996). 
21. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1994) ("The commencement of a case ... creates an estate."). 
22. 11 u.s.c. § 362 (1994). 
23. To ensure similarly situated creditors are treated equally, the Code gives debt-
ors and trustees the right to recover property or money from creditors if: (1) by transfer-
ring the property, a creditor is paid before other similarly situated creditors; or (2) a 
creditor seized the debtor's assets in anticipation of the bankruptcy filing. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 544 (Trustee can avoid certain pre-petition liens); § 547 (Trustee can avoid certain 
preferential payments made to creditors within 90 days of filing); § 548 (Trustee can 
avoid certain pre-petition fraudulent transfers); § 549 (Trustee can avoid certain post-pe-
tition transfers). While Chapter 13 Trustees also may bring avoidance actions, they gen-
erally have no incentive to do so since Chapter 13 plans generally are funded by the 
debtor's future income, not her pre-petition property. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1) (1994). 
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creditors by giving them an equal opportunity to have their 
claims repaid in an orderly collective fashion.24 
II. "LIFESTYLE" ISSUES IN BANKRUPTCY 
Addressing "lifestyle" issues is complicated, given the dia-
metrically opposing perspectives that exist in all bankruptcy 
cases.25 That is, from the creditors' perspective, the debtor 
makes a "lifestyle" choice each time she chooses to spend money 
on anything other than repaying her debts. In contrast, from the 
honest debtor's perspective, she makes a "lifestyle" choice only 
when she attempts to spend money on extravagant, lavish 
items. To protect debtors' right to a fresh start while ensuring a 
reasonable attempt to protect creditors' interests in being re-
paid, courts should be concerned only with preventing debtors 
from making lifestyle choices that economically harm creditors, 
but give debtors no tangible, economic benefits. As discussed in 
greater detail below, choices that yield tangible, necessary, eco-
nomic benefits to the debtor should be allowed and treated as 
"necessary" lifestyle choices. 26 
A Courts Reluctantly Judge Consumer Debtors' Lifestyle 
Choices 
The Code is a paradoxical statute, rife with conflicting so-
cial policies.27 The legislative history of the Code indicates that 
24. But cf. TERESA A SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 20 ("[P]rotecting 
each creditor from other creditors to achieve the fairest collective result is ... an attrac-
tive idea, but the concrete effect is that creditors are barred from taking action to pro-
tect themselves, a right that the rest of the law enshrines and vindicates."). 
25. The authors of a widely cited empirical study of consumer debt noted that: 
The question of when the law says 'let go' to the creditor and when it says 'pay' 
to the debtor is the central issue in consumer bankruptcy. IDtimately, this is a 
moral decision. Will we collectively permit a creditor to take a debtor's last 
crust of bread? Will we permit a debtor to live high and avoid legal obliga-
tions? The answer to both is no, but it is hard to find a line between the two 
that can be easily administered, cheaply enforced, and collectively endorsed. 
Id. at 9. 
26. Although deciding whether a lifestyle choice is necessary may lead to an "I know 
it when I see it" test, the definition I propose at least resolves basic disputes. Thus, 
under my proposed test, debtors are entitled to buy pencils and notebooks for their 
school aged children, but are not entitled to send their kids to an elite boarding school. 
Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not to-
day attempt further to define the kind of material I understand to be embraced within 
that shorthand description [of hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never suc-
ceed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it .... "). 
27. See, e.g., SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 8 ("[B]ankruptcy policy is [not] a 
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Congress was aware that allowing debtors to make certain 
choices potentially would conflict with bankruptcy's goals and 
policies in general, and with debt repayment speci:fically.28 How-
ever, rather than determining which lifestyle choices are neces-
sary, Congress delegated to the courts the responsibility of de-
termining the parameters of reasonable choices. 29 Courts tread 
lightly when examining consumer debtors' lifestyle choices out 
of a concern that making debt repayment too onerous will dis-
courage debtors from even attempting to repay their debts. That 
is, because Congress wants to encourage debtors to repay debts 
in a Chapter 13 case rather than discharge them in Chapter 7, 30 
courts (and scholars) argue that making Chapter 13 debtors suf-
fer too much simply will discourage debtors from even attempt-
function merely of facts. Bankruptcy raises profound moral issues as well as financial 
ones. It is a concept and an experience surrounded by moral ambiguity and filled with 
paradox."); Laurence B. Wohl, Pension and Bankruptcy Laws: A Clash of Social Policies, 
64 N.C. L. REv. 3, 32 (1985). See also Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't. of 
Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 505-08 (1986) (noting conflict between bankruptcy policy 
that allows trustees to abandon burdensome property and environmental policy that re-
quires property owners to cleanup contaminated property); United States v. Whiting 
Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 211-212 (1983) (noting conflict between bankruptcy policy that 
prevents creditor collection activities and rn.s policy that assesses tax liens for failure to 
remit withholding payments). 
28. For example, Congress expressly noted a debtor's right to convert nonexempt 
property into exempt property in order "to make full use of the exemptions" permitted 
by the law even though exercising that right allows debtors to avoid repaying their 
debts. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 361 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.AN. 5963, 6317. 
Thus, pre-filing exemption planning is not a per se abuse of bankruptcy laws. See dis-
cussion infra Part lli.B. 7. 
29. In a prepared statement to the United States Judiciary Committee, Professor 
Philip Shuchman discussed a court's responsibility in the context of the "Average 
Bankrupt": 
The bankruptcy judges will have to acljudicate what is reasonable for a family's 
living expenses .... This process could also extend to such matters as whether 
a child must attend public school or may enroll in a private school with tuition 
and whether a debtor may have a car or must use public transportation; as 
well as to whether a couple could plan for and have a child .... 
Bankruptcy Improvements Act: Hearings on S.333 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 
98th Cong. 418-19 (1983) (statement of Philip Shuchman, Professor of Law, Rutgers 
School of Law (Newark)). See also In re Packham, 126 B.R. 603, 609 (Bankr. D. Utah 
1991) ("While the court attempts to avoid superimposing its values for those of the debt-
ors', certain sections of the Code require it to make decisions that unavoidably are made 
based on its sense of equity of what is right and wrong."). 
30. See Associates Comm. Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d 1036, 1057 (5th Cir. 
1996), cert. granted, Associates Comm. Corp. v. Rash, 117 S.Ct. 758 (1997), and rev'd, As-
sociates Comm. Corp. v. Rash, 117 S.Ct. 1879 (1997), and remanded, In re Rash, 118 
F.3d 1081 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he legislative history clearly reflects Congress' intent to 
encourage debtors to use Chapter 13 and make payments to their unsecured creditors, 
rather than to opt for a Chapter 7 liquidation."). 
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ing to repay their debts. 31 
Two powerful protections, one not available under state law 
and one available only in Chapter 13 cases, ensure that even if 
courts deny certain choices, most debtors will continue to prefer 
filing for relief under Chapter 13. The first protection, the auto-
matic stay, shields a person from creditor collection activities 
only if the consumer files for protection under the federal bank-
ruptcy Code.32 Second, debtors who have non-exempt33 assets 
they want to keep almost always will prefer filing for protection 
under Chapter 13, because Chapter 13 debtors keep most (if not 
· all) their pre-petition property.34 Thus, a Chapter 13 debtor who 
files for bankruptcy to prevent an impending foreclosure on her 
home35 still most likely will prefer Chapter 13 over Chapter 736 
even if the court refuses to permit an unnecessary choice like 
sending her child to a boarding school or giving money to a non-
profit institution. 
In addition to not wanting to create disincentives for debt 
repayment, courts and commentators also suggest that it is un-
seemly for courts to scrutinize debtors' lifestyles and subjec-
tively determine how debtors ought to live. 37 These critics con-
31. See In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348, 355 n.10 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) ("A broad inter-
pretation of what constitutes disposable income would contravene the congressional in-
tention of encouraging debtors to use chapter 13 .... "); Karen Gross, Preserving A Fresh 
Start for the Individual Debtor: The Case For Narrow Construction of the Consumer 
Credit Amendments, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 59, 119-20 (1986) (discussing incentives provided 
in Consumer Credit Amendments for debtors to use Chapter 13). 
32. 11 u.s.c. § 362 (1994). 
33. If a debtor can claim property as exempt under section 522 of the Code, the 
property cannot be used to satisfy creditors' claims. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1994). 
34. 11 u.s.c. § 1327(b) (1994). 
35. Many consumers file for relief shortly before a scheduled foreclosure sale simply 
to halt the sale. See, e.g., In re Fields, 190 B.R. 16, 18 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995) (noting that 
the case "obviously was filed to stop a foreclosure and loss of a family home"); In re 
Oglesby, 158 B.R. 602, 603 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (observing that debtors had filed for 
bankruptcy four times to halt an imminent foreclosure on home). 
36. Some scholars question whether Chapter 13 provides greater benefits to a home-
owner debtor than Chapter 7 does. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 141. 
37. See In re Anderson, 143 B.R. 719, 721 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1992) (the court should 
not attempt to inject itself into "inherently personal choices"); Michigan v. Green (In re 
Green), 103 B.R. 852, 853 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988) (the bankruptcy court is urged to 
maintain a debtor's lifestyle where there is no obvious indulgence in luxuries); In re 
Bien, 95 B.R. 281, 283 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989) ("[T]he court should not require drastic 
changes in the debtor's life or substitute its own values for those of the debtor regarding 
fundamental aspects of the debtor's life."); In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348, 355 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 1988) ("In general 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) should not be considered a mandate for a 
court to superimpose its values and substitute its judgment for those of the debtor on 
basic choices about appropriate maintenlll!ce and support."); In re Otero, 48 B.R. 704, 
708 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) ("'t is not in the public interest to squeeze the last dollar 
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tend that courts should prevent debtors only from making 
lavish, unnecessary. lifestyle choices because allowing courts to 
regulate all aspects of a debtor's lifestyles could have the effect 
of "equalizing all debtors to the same social standard on the ba-
sis of the court's own predilections of how people in financial 
trouble ought to live."38 While courts should not require debtors 
. to drop their standard of living to the poverty level, 39 courts nec-
essarily must second-guess debtors' lifestyle choices because 
Congress relies on courts to make that determination.40 Since 
from Chapter 13 debtors to fund a Chapter 13 plan."). Cf., In re McDaniel I, 126 B.R. 
782, 784 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) ("[C]ourts must balance the interests of creditors 
against debtors' entitlement to determine the manner in which they should maintain 
and support themselves."). 
For a detailed discussion on this issue, see 8 CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 
'l]1325.08[4][b], at 1325-52 to 1325-54 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996): 
[A] court determining the debtor's disposable income ... should not mandateD 
drastic changes in the debtor's lifestyle to fit some preconceived norm for 
Chapter 13 debtors. The debtor's expenses should be scrutinized only for luxu-
ries which are not enjoyed by an average American family .... [T]he court 
cannot and should not order debtors to alter their lifestyles where there is no 
obvious indulgence in luxuries, even when one or more unsecured creditors de-
mand such a change. [This would] contravene the intent of Congress. 
See, e.g., Irving A Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies: Chap-
ter 7 Dismissal on the Basis of "Substantial Abuse", 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327, 351-353 
(1985) ("[T]he statute ... requires the court to be the arbiter and architect of the 
defendant's lifestyle. In determining how much of the debtor's income is disposable, the 
court must . . . determine which of the debtor's expenses are justifiable . . . . Vesting 
bankruptcy courts with such decisions is disturbing on several grounds."); Steven L. Har-
ris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg's Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 30 UCLA L. REv. 
327, 356 (1982) ("[J]udges should not be charged with the duty to make moral judg-
ments or to second-guess personal decisions."). 
38. Gross, supra note 31, at 132. See also id. at 123 n.274 (quoting Hearing on a 
Uniform System of Bankruptcy, 72nd Cong. 1st Sess. 753 (1932) (statement of Jacob I. 
Weinstein) ("There is no man who will see eye to eye with the other man as to how he 
should live, and I would resent any person, court or otherwise, telling me [how to 
live].")). 
39. See Teresa A Sullivan et al., Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge: An Anal-
ysis of the Creditors' Data, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 1091, 1133 [hereinafter, Limiting Access] 
("If creditors were able to capture all the gains from working that exceeded the poverty 
level, there could well be many debtors who would decide that it simply was no longer 
worthwhile to work.") According to the statistics cited by these authors, the poverty level 
for food was based on the cost of a "minimal diet, suitable for 'emergency use.'" Id. at 
1142 n.317. 
40. Congress suggested that courts look to the Labor Department cost of living 
figures to develop acceptable norms. S. REP. No. 98-65, at 22 (1983). One court 
remarked: 
The statutory language of § 1325(b) provides little guidance as to the proper 
scope of inquiry of a bankruptcy court in its determination of whether particu-
lar budgeted expenses are reasonably necessary for the maintenance and sup-
port of the debtor or the debtor's dependents. The legislative history of 
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courts must evaluate the debtors' lifestyles, they must develop 
objective criteria to use when deciding whether to condone ele-
ments of that lifestyle. 
B. Courts Should Narrowly Construe the Concept of 
"Necessary" 
Commentators have analyzed whether a particular lifestyle 
choice is reasonable, necessary, or otherwise should be allowed 
in a particular case based on a particular Code provision. 41 
However, such treatment of lifestyle choices fails to ask whether 
certain choices categorically should be denied because they are 
not economically necessary or provide no tangible benefits di-
rectly to the debtor. With few notable exceptions, 42 courts have 
not narrowly defined the term "necessary'' nor will they ac-
knowledge that the Code simply does not give debtors the right 
to make unnecessary lifestyle choices. Instead, commentators 
and courts suggest that debtors generally should be allowed to 
make any lifestyle choice that is convenient, useful, or consis-
tent with the debtor's pre-petition lifestyle.43 
Courts generally deny lifestyle choices only when they ap-
pear excessive, not because the choices themselves are not eco-
nomic necessities.44 Bankruptcy courts should narrowly interpret 
the term "necessary" for several reasons. First, the most natural 
§ 1325(b) has been described as 'singularly vague and unenlightening.' 
In re Stein, 91 B.R. 796, 801 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (quoting In re Jones, 55 B.R. 462, 
465 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985)). 
41. See sources cited supra note 5. 
42. See In re Sutliff, 79 B.R. 151, 157 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y 1987) (defining "reasonably 
necessary" as a standard of adequacy that supports the debtor's basic needs, without re-
gard to the debtor's former societal status or accustomed lifestyle). 
43. For example, a leading bankruptcy commentator argues that a court, in evaluat-
ing whether a budget items are reasonably necessary, "should be reluctant to impose its 
own values with respect to "any expenditures, even those which seem unnecessary" if 
the debtor's total household income is modest. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 37, 
'il 1325.08[4][b], at 1325-53. Likewise, this commentator argues that private schooling 
can be construed as "necessary" because "it is not unusual for families in some areas to 
send their children to parochial schools." Id. Although it also may be common for fami-
lies in some areas to enroll their children in dressage classes, it is beyond the pale of 
reason to conclude that this educational experience is "necessary." 
44. For example, the court in In re Tinneberg, 59 B.R. 634, 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
1986), agreed to exclude only "unnecessary luxuries" from support. How the court could 
approve a Chapter 13 budget that included "necessary" luxuries is puzzling, given that 
"necessary" and "luxury" appear to be ·mutually exclusive terms. See also In re Stein, 91 
B.R. 796, 802 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio) (1988) (refusing to confirm a Chapter 13 plan that has 
"manifestly excessive" monthly expenditures). 
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understanding of the word "necessary" is essential or required, 45 
not "anything-as-long-as-it's-not-extravagant." Second, if credi-
tors understand that debtors have an absolute right to make 
only economically necessary choices, then reasonable creditors 
will limit their objections to only choices that are non-necessary. 
Reducing creditors' litigation expenses will result in savings in 
cost and time to both the debtor and creditor and should, in the 
long run, decrease the cost of credit.46 
Narrowly interpreting "necessary'' also is consistent with 
the interpretations courts have used in other sections of the 
Code and other federal statutes. For example, in deciding the 
"reasonably necessary" property a debtor can· exempt under 11 
U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E), one court limited the property to subsis-
tence, not lifestyle maintenance. 47 Likewise, another court lim-
ited the property "necessary" for an effective reorganization for 
an individual Chapter 11 debtor to only essential or indispensa-
ble items. 48 
Narrowly defining necessary provides the additional benefit 
of eliminating courts' incentive to make subjective conclusions 
about whether proposed lifestyle choices are too extravagant or 
too luxurious. Similarly, narrowly construing necessary prevents 
courts from relying on imprecise concepts like "undue hardship," 
45. See WEBSTER'S THmD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1510 (1986); BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1029 (6th ed. 1990). 
46. See Mark Snyderman, Comment, What's So Good About Good Faith? The Good 
Faith Performance Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1335, ·1361 
(1988) (discussing effect litigation may have on the availability of credit and on credit 
terms). 
Clearly stating that debtors must sacrifice non-necessary lifestyle choices also may 
help convince the public that there are detrimental social consequences to filing for 
bankruptcy. Debtors should be expected to sacrifice non-necessary expenditures and en-
gage in conservative spending habits-just as honest, poor, non-debtors are forced to do 
every day of their lives. While I do not suggest that courts use the Code to strip a debtor 
of her dignity during the bankruptcy case, bankruptcy should be a humbling experience 
which requires some sacrifice. See Gross, supra note 31, at 74 ("Preservation of self-
worth has been a prized value-if a debtor's self-respect can be preserved throughout a 
case, it has been argued, the individual debtor will have the incentive to begin a new life 
and to reestablish herself as a productive member of society."). 
47. 'In re Velis, 123 B.R. 497, 510 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991). See also Warren v. Taff (In re 
Taft), 10 B.R. 101, 107 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (requiring that courts set aside an 
amount "sufficient to sustain basic needs, not related to his former status in society or 
the lifestyle to which he is accustomed"). 
48. In re Gregory, 39 B.R. 405, 410 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn 1984). See also Western Air 
Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 422-23 (1985) (concluding that courts should nar-
rowly construe "reasonably necessary" exception in Age Discrimination in Employment 
statute). 
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"good faith," or "substantial abuse" to prevent lifestyle choices.49 
In defining "necessary", courts should not negatively define 
it as "non-extravagant"50 because there is a wide gap between 
what is "necessary" (water) and what is "extravagant" (imported, 
sparkling mineral water).51 Courts must say that food and water 
49. Congress did not define any of these terms. Moreover, many of the provisions 
that use these terms were hurriedly added to the Code in the 1984 Consumer Credit 
Amendments to eliminate perceived abuses of the Code. The Bankruptcy Amendments 
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as 
amended in scattered section of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). See Gross, supra note 31. 
Courts' attempts to use these broad, highly subjective concepts to curtail lifestyle is-
sues have produced mischievous, unsatisfying results. For example, a court can refuse to 
confirm a Chapter 13 (or Chapter 11) plan that is not proposed in "good faith." 11 U.S. C. 
§ 1325(aX3) & § 1129(a)(3) (1994). Although the good faith requirement only applies to 
inquiries concerning the filing of the plan, courts have also dismissed Chapter 13 cases 
when the debtor apparently did not file the petition (rather than the plan) in good faith. 
See In re Lilley, 91 F.3d 491, 496 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1354-55 (7th 
Cir. 1992); Eisen v. Curry (In re Eisen), 14 F.3d 469, 470 (9th Cir. 1994); Gier v. Farmers 
State Bank of Lucas, Kan. (In re Gier), 986 F.2d 1326, 1329-30 (lOth Cir. 1993). While 
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Act expressly required that petitions be filed in good 
faith, Congress chose not to retain this requirement when it enacted the Code in 1978. 
Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, 11 U.S. C. § 541 (1976) (repealed 1978). ("Upon the filing 
of a petition by a debtor, the judge shall enter an order approving the petition, if satis-
fied that it complies with the requirements of this chapter and has been flled in good 
faith .... "). 
Courts have yet to develop objective criteria to assess good faith and instead gener-
ally find that plans are filed in good faith if they are consistent with the policy objec-
tives and purposes of Chapter 13. See Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 
427, 431-2 (6th Cir. 1982); Vrrginia M. Hunt, The Bankruptcy Good Faith Issue, 47 CoN-
SUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 402 (1993). One court has described the good faith filing doctrine as 
"an amorphous gestalt, devoid of reasoning and impenetrable to understanding." In re 
Victoria Ltd. Partnership, 187 B.R. 54, 62 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995). Commentators ques-
tion the policy implications of allowing creditors to impose subjectively contrived require-
ments upon other sections of Chapter 13. See Conrad K Cyr, The Chapter 13 "Good 
Faith" Tempest: An Analysis and Proposal for Change, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 271, 271 
(1981); see also John T. Kelly, Note, Good Faith Analysis under Chapter 13-The Totality 
of Circumstances Approach: Handeen v. LeMaire, 23 CREIGHTON L. REv. 573 (1990); Ellen 
M. Hom, Note, Good Faith and Chapter 13 Discharge: How Much Discretion is Too 
Much?, 11 CARDozo L. REv. 657, 666 (1990); Elisabeth S. Ladd, Note, In re Okoreeh-
Baah, The Status of Good Faith Under Chapter 13, 20 U. ToL. L. REv. 699, 718 (1989); 
Richard S. Bell, The Effect of the Disposable Income Test of Section 1325(b)(1)(B) Upon 
the Good Faith Inquiry of Section 1325(a)(3), 5 BANKR. DEV. J. 267 (1987). 
50. Congres!l defines "luxury goods and services" in the negative in 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(2)(C) (1994). This section defines luxury goods as those not reasonably required 
for the debtor's (or her dependent's) support. Id. One court interpreting this section con-
cluded that luxury items are extravagant, indulgent and nonessential. In re Hemadez, 
208 B.R. 872, 881 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997). 
51. An example would be a Chapter 13 budget that includes a cable television ex-
pense. A court that approves this budget implicitly deems the expense to be necessary. 
That a monthly cable television bill of $30 is not extravagant does not then make it 
"necessary." 
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are "necessary," caviar and sparkling mineral water are not.52 
Choices that fall in the gap between those that are "extrava-
gant" and those that are "necessary" (i.e., discretionary expendi-
tures) should be permitted only if allowing the choice is not eco-
nomically detrimental to creditors. 
C. "Necessary" Should Be Defined Relative to Those Benefits 
that the Government Either Provides, or Subsidizes 
Because bankruptcy relief no longer is designed to be puni-
tive, 53 courts should not limit necessary expenses only to those 
that would be expended by someone who lives at the poverty 
level.54 However, courts should not automatically deem the cur-
rent expenditures debtors list on the schedules they file with the 
court to be "necessary."55 More importantly, courts should not 
feel compelled to allow the debtor to continue in the lifestyle to 
which she became accustomed since the bankruptcy filing itself 
establishes that the debtor can no longer afford that lifestyle. 
Although it may be impossible to quantify "necessary" in a 
way that satisfies all creditors, defining "necessary" expenses as 
those benefits the government either provides or subsidizes pro-
vides an objective standard courts, debtors, and creditors can 
rely on and refer to whenever a lifestyle issue arises in a bank-
ruptcy case. Because the federal government directly subsidizes 
impoverished citizens' food, 56 housing, 57 and medical 58 expenses, 
these federally subsidized expenditures should be deemed "nee-
52. One court's ruling noted that an "inquiry into a debtor's 'reasonably necessary' 
expenses is unavoidably a judgment of values and lifestyles, and close questions emerge 
•.•. However, a Chapter 13 debtor cannot expect to 'go first class' when 'coach' is avail-
able." In re Sutliff, 79 B.R. 151, 156-57 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting In re Kitson, 65 
B.R. 615, 622 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986)). 
53. See generally, Vern Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 
Cor.t L.J. 226, 228 (1976). 
54. See discussion supra note 39; see also In re Larson, 203 B.R. 176, 180 (w.D. 
Okla. 1996) ("Appropriate interpretation of provisions of the Bankruptcy Code should lie 
somewhere between making debtors totally comfortable and requiring them to sell ap-
ples on the street in order to survive."). 
55. See BANKRUPrCY CODE, RULEs AND FoRMS, Form 6A, at 649 (West 1987). For ex-
ample, that a debtor actually spent $500 monthly on recreation, clubs and ~ntertain­
ment, newspapers, magazines, etc., does not then make those expenses "necessary." 
56. Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1994). 
57. I.R.C. § 42 (1994) (low-income housing credit); United States Housing Act of 
1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1994) (section 8 Federal Financial Housing Assistance); I.R.C. 
§ 25 (1994) (interest on home mortgage is deductible). 
58. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 & 1396 (1994) (Medicaid) and 45 U.S.C. §§ 228 & 301 
(1994) (Medicare). 
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essary." Similarly, because taxpayers' child care59 and business60 
expenses are subsidized, these expenditures also should be 
deemed "necessary." AB some states exempt clothing purchases 
from sales taxes, 61 these expenses also should be deemed "neces-
sary." Finally, as both federal and state governments give the 
poor minimal, unrestricted funds,62 and because taxpayers may 
deduct expenses related to unexpected losses, 63 "necessary" also 
should be defined to allow for minimal, incidental items and for 
modest, unexpected contingencies. 64 
Federal and state governments also allow taxpayers to de-
duct charitable contributions on their income tax returns65 and 
some taxpayers can receive a tax deduction for support they 
give to the elderly or disabled.66 Consequently, these expenses 
theoretically would fit within my proposed definition of "neces-
sary." Because, however, consumer bankruptcies are designed to 
economically rehabilitate only debtors, 67 courts should limit nec-
essary choices to those that provide tangible, economic benefits 
directly to the debtor. 
Although debtors may receive intangible, psychological, or 
emotional benefits from giving money to non-creditors, bank-
ruptcy is designed to restructure a debtor's tangible, economic 
59. See Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 602; Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 211 (codified in scattered sections of the 42 U.S.C. and 2 U.S.C.). 
60. Any job-related expenses that a debtor can deduct on her federal income tax re-
turn are economically necessary expenditures even if the expenditures relate to seem-
ingly "luxury" items like business travel, meals, and entertainment expenses. See I.R.S. 
Pub. 529 (1996) (explaining I.R.C. §§ 162, 274 (1994)). 
61. See MAss. ANN. LAws, ch. 64H, § 6(k) (West 1996) (exempting sales of clothing 
valued at less than $175). 
62. See 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (1994) (general assistance). 
63. I.R.C. § 165 (1994) (casualty and theft issues). 
64. See In re Fries, 68 B.R. 676, 683 & n. 7 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) ("A reasonable re-
serve fund in a debtor's budget is not violative of section 1325(b)(1)(B)."). The contin-
gency line item should be a small one because, as discussed infra Part III.B.6, the Code 
already allows debtors to modify their plans if they encounter adverse, unforeseen cir-
cumstances that make it impossible for them to complete all plan payments. See 11 
U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1) & (2) (1994). 
65. I.R.C. § 170 (1996). 
66. I.R.C. § 22 (1996). 
67. See, e.g., SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 6 ("The purpose of bankruptcy law, 
properly used rather than abused, is to serve as a financial hospital for people sick 'vith 
debt."). In contrast, in Chapter 11 corporate filings, courts also must balance the societal 
costs imposed by a business failure. Those costs would include laying off employees, de-
priving a locality of a source of tax revenue, and eliminating a potential supplier of 
goods to, or buyer for, other businesses. See Warren, supra note 13. Because these issues 
are not raised in consumer filings, it is appropriate for courts to focus solely on the 
rights of the debtors and their creditors. 
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obligations to her creditors.68 Choosing to spend money on third-
party, non-creditors provides no direct, tangible, economic bene-
fits to the debtor.69 For example, if the debtor purchases a People 
magazine for her own use, she has received a tangible, economic 
(albeit non-necessary) benefit. In contrast, if the debtor 
purchases the magazine for her father, she derives no tangible 
economic benefit from the purchase, though she may derive psy-
chological benefits from the joy caused by giving her father a 
present. ·However, it is impossible to verify or quantify any tan-
gible feel-good benefit a debtor receives after performing an al-
truistic act.70 Since those intangible benefits cannot be sold to 
repay creditors, lifestyle choices that provide no tangible eco-
nomic benefits to the debtor should be denied. Thus, proposed 
contributions to third-parties like charities or family members 
would not be necessary and should be denied unless the contri-
butions are business expenses71 or the debtor has a legal obliga- , 
tion to make those contributions. 72 
The eligibility requirements for most government benefits 
are indexed to economic need. 73 As some tax credits and deduc-
tions are available to non-needy citizens, creditors might argue 
that defining "necessary" solely in relationship to government 
benefits will cause some non-necessary benefits to be deemed 
necessary.74 Although not all government benefits and subsidies 
are need-based, defining "necessary" in relation to those benefits 
68. Id. 
69. The direct/indirect distinction already is found in commercial law. Article 3-605 
of the Uniform Commercial Code protects an indirect beneficiary of a loan from harm 
caused as a result of a subsequent modification of the loan between the lender and the 
direct beneficiary. Specifically, an indorser or accommodation party of a loan is dis-
charged of his obligation to repay the loan if the lender fails to obtain the consent of the 
indirect beneficiary before modifying the principle borrower's obligations. See U.C.C. § 3-
605(c) & (d). 
70. See Marleen A. O'Connor, A Socio-Economic Approach to the Japanese Corporate 
Governance Structure, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1529, 1545 (1993) (noting the inability to 
quantify acts that serve one's self-interest). 
71~ See infra note 199. 
72. See, e.g., CAL. FML CODE § 3910 (West 1996) (outlining parents' duty to provide 
support for disabled, adult children). 
73. E.g., Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 602 (1994), and Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 211 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); Sup-
plemental Security Income (SSI), 42 U.S.C. § 1381-1383 (1994), United States Housing 
Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437F (1994) ; Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2030 
(1994); 42 HS.C. § 1396 and § 301 (Medicaid). 
74. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 25, 162 (1996), I.R.C. § 25 (deductibility of interest on home 
mortgages) (1996), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-8.4 (West 1996) (exempting all clothing sales 
regardless of value). 
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nonetheless should satisfy most creditors. For example, while 
deductions for. business expenses and tax exemptions for cloth-
ing purchases generally are not need-indexed, allowing these ex-
penditures obviously benefits creditors because they help debt-
ors earn a living and, thus, repay their debts. If creditors feel 
debtors have budgeted for an excessive amount of clothing or 
claim too many expenses as business expenses, creditors can ob-
ject that the amount of those otherwise necessary expenses is 
not reasonable. In other words, even if creditors concede that 
clothing· expenses are necessary, they are not required to con-
cede that a $500 monthly proposed .clothing expenditure is 
necessary. 
Moreover, even if a few creditors disagree with defining 
"necessary" relative to government benefits and subsidies, most 
rational creditors should accept this definition. First, any ra-
tional and reasonable creditor would agree that food, clothing, 
shelter, and medical care are necessary for debtors' economic re-
habilitation because these benefits support the debtor, current 
creditors (whose can be repaid if the debtor can work), and fu-
ture creditors (who can sell goods and services to the economi-
cally rehabilitated debtor). In addition, relying on benefits and 
subsidies to define necessary provides a neutral definition for 
the expenses that are necessary for most Americans. None of 
the credits or deductions were enacted solely to benefit debtors. 
Instead, the decision to provide a number of benefits or subsi-
dies to needy Americans (and a limited number of benefits to 
non-needy Americans) was made by democratically elected bod-
ies as a result of numerous political compromises. 75 
Ill PROPOSED TREATMENT OF LIFESTYLE CHOICES 
A. Non-Necessary Lifestyle Choices 
1. Non-Necessary Choices That Prevent Debt Repayment. 
While some creditors object to expenditures in a Chapter 7 
debtor's proposed budget,76 most budget objections are made in 
Chapter 13 cases. Chapter 13 debtors typically keep all their 
property in exchange for devoting all disposable income to fund-
ing the plan. 77 Disposable income means all income a debtor re-
75. See Brian Van Vleck, A Comparison of Japanese and American Taxation of Capi· 
tal Gains, 14 HAsr!NGs lNT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 719, 724 (1991) (discussing balancing act 
Congress engaged in when making sweeping reforms of the Code in 1986). 
76. See discussion infra Part III.A3. 
77. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (1994). Both Chapter 11 and 13 debtors must file a plan 
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ceives minus income "reasonably necessary" for the maintenance 
and support of the debtor and her dependents. If the plan is 
confirmed78 and the debtor makes all plan payments, 79 the 
debtor receives a discharge of most debts-including some that 
would not be discharged in a Chapter 7 or individual Chapter 
11 case.80 
Creditors who will not be paid in full can ask the court to 
deny confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan if the debtor fails to 
devote all her disposable income to repaying her nondischarge-
able debts.81 Even though disposable income means all funds not 
"reasonably necessary" for the maintenance or support of the 
debtor or her dependents, some debtors have included non-nec-
essary expenditures like cable television, 82 recreational newspa-
per and magazine subscriptions83 and private school tuition84 in 
that explains how they intend to repay their debts. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121, 1321 (1994). 
78. In addition to requiring debtors to use their disposable income to fund the plan, 
the Code requires Chapter 13 debtors to file the plan in good faith, satisfy the best in-
terests of creditors test, and pay claims in a specified order. See 11 U.S. C. § 1322 (1994). 
79. Some courts question whether a plan is proposed in "good faith" if the plan pro-
poses minimal or zero payments to unsecured creditors. See, e.g., Pioneer Bank of Long-
mont v. Rasmussen, 888 F.2d 703 (lOth Cir. 1989); In re Farmer, 186 B.R. 781 (Bank.r. 
D.R.I. 1995); In re Strauss, 184 B.R. 349 (Bank.r. D. Neb. 1995); In re Anderson, 173 B.R. 
226 (D. Colo. 1993); In re Stewart, 109 B.R. 998 (Bank.r. D. Kan. 1990); cf. Deans v. 
O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968, 970 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[N]owhere in Chapter 13 is there any 
mention of a percentage or proportionate amount that must be offered to unsecured 
creditors in every case."); In re Greer, 60 B.R. 547, 553 (Bank.r. C.D. Cal. 1986) ("Con-
gress could have required that a Chapter 13 plan provide that unsecured creditors . . . 
be paid in full. It could also have provided that unsecured creditors be paid 70%, or 30%, 
or some other minimum amount of their claim. However, Congress decided against this 
approach."). 
80. The most common Chapter 7 nondischargeable debts are taxes and fines, debts 
that result from fraudulent or willful acts, child support and alimony, debts for personal 
injuries caused by the debtor's drunken operation of a motor vehicle, and student loans. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(l), (2), (4)-(9). A Chapter 1? debtor is said to receive a "super-
discharge" because, in return for repaying some of her debts, she keeps most of her prop-
erty and discharges most of her debts. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 118 (1977), reprinted 
.in 1978 U.S.C.C.AN. 5963, 6079. The only debts that are nondischargeable in Chapter 
13 are child support and alimony obligations, student loans, drunk driving personal in-
jury claims, and criminal restitution or fines. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2),(3) (1994). Thus, 
debtors must repay these unsecured debts after she receives a discharge, even if the 
Chapter 13 plan does not propose making any payments to creditors who hold unsecured 
claims. 
81. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(l)(B) (1994). 
82. See Bungert v. Fort Eustis Fed. Credit Union, No. 90-2354, 1992 WL 35797 (4th 
Cir. Feb. 27, 1992). 
83. See In re Henricksen, 131 B.R. 467 (Bank.r. N.D. Okla. 1991). A debtor should be 
allowed to include the costs of newspapers or magazines if the periodicals are work-
related. Such expenditures would be "necessary" for the debtor's support because it 
would help the debtor generate future income, and thus, repay current debts and pay fu-
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their proposed budgets. Courts typically have allowed expendi-
tures for such items as long as the amount of the proposed ex-
penditure is "reasonable" and, thus, does not appear to be ex-
travagant. 85 In effect, if an expense is reasonable, courts will 
deem it to be "necessary."86 If necessary equals reasonable, it 
thus follows that the opposite of necessary would be unreasona-
ble, extravagant, or luxurious. Accepting this equation, however, 
creates serious problems of statutory construction. 
First, since courts should give effect to all words Congress 
uses in a statute, courts should not assume that Congress 
meant for the words "reasonably" and "necessary" to be synony-
mous.87 Second, equating necessary with reasonable produces 
absurd results when examining a Chapter 13 budget. If "neces-
sary'' means "non-luxury," debtors would have the right to 
ture debts. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
84. See Univest-Coppell Village, Ltd. v. Nelson, 204 B.R. 497, 500 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 
1996); see also In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Jones, 55 B.R. 
462 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). See generally In re Nolan, 140 B.R. 797 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
1992) (Chapter 7 debtor proposed to send his son to private school); Conner v. Dlinois 
State Scholarship Comm'n (In re Conner), 89 B.R. 744 (Bankr. N.D. ill. 1988) (question-
ing a Chapter 7 debtor's decision to support a daughter who decided to attend a private 
college). 
85. See In re Anderson, 143 B.R. 719, 721 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1992) (finding that a 
court "should not become preoccupied with the exercise of a 'line item veto' over budget 
item," or "attempt to inject itself into such inherently personal choices as whether lim-
ited funds are spent on charity, movies, cable television, music lessons, sport leagues or 
health clubs"); Bruce Edward Kosub & Susan K Thompson, Note, The Religious Debtor's 
Conviction To Tithe as the Price of a Chapter 13 Discharge, 66 TEx. L. REv. 873, 886 
(1988) ("Although some courts have disallowed recreational expenditures, the determina-
tive factor seems to be the extravagance of the expenditure rather than a feeling that 
some recreation is not a basic need."); In re Cavanaugh, 175 B.R. 369, 374 (Bankr. D. 
Idaho 1994) (acknowledging that most courts permit a Chapter 13 debtor "some recrea-
tional spending" for "items which are not absolute necessities of life"). 
86. One court used a historical approach to decide what is "reasonably necessary" 
for the maintenance of a home. In re Larson, 203 B.R. 176, 181 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 
1996). While the court concluded that a home computer was not reasonably necessary in 
the American home in 1996, it found that "[o]ver the years, the presence of a television 
set became virtually universal, and its use as the family's primary source of information 
and entertainment transformed it from a relatively expensive curiosity to a virtual ne-
cessity which can be purchased for relatively little." Id. Thus, by this court's definition, 
"necessary" items include all things that most people own as long as those items are not 
expensive. Id. While the court probably is correct that most families own televisions, 
that this particular consumer good is popular and widely-owned does not make it "neces-
sary." But see In re Ratliff, 209 B.R. 534, 535 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1997) (allowing debtor 
to exempt a personal computer under state exemption law because "[t]he computer has 
indeed become an integral part as a resource for information coming into households."). 
87. See 2A NoRMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 46.06 at 119-
120 (5th ed. 1992); Petitioners v. Spendthrifl; Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (courts 
should not render statutory language void and without effect). 
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budget for meals at McDonald's and subscriptions to People 
magazine simply because these expenses are not extravagant. 
Adopting the necessary equals reasonable analysis also fu-
els both creditors' and society's perception that debtors are not 
required to make financial sacrifices when they file for bank-
ruptcy relief. Especially in the context of a Chapter 13 plan, 
which is designed "to provide the maximum recovery to creditors 
by means of a substantial effort by the debtor to pay all debts, "88 
courts should require debtors to reorder their financial priorities 
and sacrifice non-essential lifestyle choices.89 Indeed, the legisla-
tive history of Chapter 13 illustrates Congress's understanding 
that debt repayment most likely requires sacrifice by the debtor 
and an alteration in the debtor's pre-petition consumption 
level.90 As such, Congress appeared to have anticipated that 
Chapter 13 debtors would be required to use their post-petition 
income-except that necessary to support them and their fami-
lies-to repay debts. 
Although debtors should not be permitted to make economi-
cally non-necessary lifestyle choices associated with their pre-
petition lifestyles, courts should not impose budgetary restric-
tions on debtors that permanently drive them into the lowest 
socio-economic level.9~ Moreover, courts should not categorically 
forbid debtors from choosing to use properly budgeted funds to 
make an extravagant lifestyle choice. Instead, debtors should be 
88. In re Lees, 192 B.R. 756, 759 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1994) (quoting In re Packham, 
126 B.R. 603 (Bankr. D. Utah 1991)). 
89. See also In re Carpico, 117 B.R. 335, 338 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (emphasizing 
that "there are certain sacrifices that must be made by a debtor who chooses to pursue 
the remedies of Chapter 13"); In re Reyes, 106 B.R. 155, 159 (Bankr. N.D. ill. 1989) _ 
("Chapter 13 was intended to give debtors a chance to repay debts, which may require 
some sacrifices by the debtor. It was not intended to be used as a tool for facilitating a 
debtor's already excessive and over-indulgent lifestyle."). 
This analysis also would apply if a debtor decided to leave a financially lucrative 
(but emotionally unsatisfying) job and spend three years as an unprod or minimally-paid 
missionary. If the debtor wants to protect her property by filing for relief under Chapter 
13, she should be forced to sacrifice this self-fulfilling, albeitly noble, lifestyle choice. See 
In re Rappleye, 210 B.R. 336 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997) (stating that working in a volun-
tary position for a church is a lifestyle choice debtors cannot make when they have law-
ful divorce support obligations); see also Leonard J. Long, Religious Exercise as Credit 
Risk, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 119, 141 (1993). 
90. S. REP. No. 98-65, at 22 (1983). 
91. See Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Rejoinder: Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Dis-
charge [hereinafter Rejoinder], 1984 WIS. L. REv. 1087, 1096 (1984). In arguing against a 
rule that Chapter 7 relief be denied to debtors who can repay their debts, the authors 
note that "bankruptcy may serve other social functions, such as keeping the struggling 
middle class from sliding back to the lowest socio-economic levels when they face finan-
cial reversals." Id. 
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allowed to sacrifice economically necessary items to purchase 
non-necessary items. 
Allowing debtors to purchase non-necessary items with 
funds properly allocated for economically necessary items does 
not harm the debtor's right to a fresh start, since the debtor 
herself must choose to sacrifice a necessary item to "pay" for a 
non-necessary one. Likewise, since creditors were never entitled 
to payments earmarked for economically necessary expendi-
tures, they are not harmed if a debtor chooses to purchase an 
economically non-necessary item by restricting her budgeted ex-
penses for clothing or food. 92 
It is highly unlikely that any social services agency or state 
or federal legislature would support increasing a welfare recipi-
ent's public assistance to ensure that she can eat at McDonald's 
or read People magazine. 93 Since debtors do not have a "right" to 
purchase non-necessary items, courts should not treat those 
nice-to-have items (like eating out) as if they were need-to-have 
items (like bread and milk). Instead, a debtor who is committed 
to buying nice-to-have items should be required to "pay'' for 
them by sacrificing need-to-have items.94 Since poor non-debtors 
can choose to sacrifice a necessary item in order to splurge on a 
luxury item, courts should give debtors the same option. As long 
as a court concludes that the debtor's proposed total food budget 
is reasonable, 95 it should not dictate whether the debtor uses the 
92. See, e.g., In re Faulkner, 165 B.R. 644, 647 (1994) (w.D. Mo.) (observing that a 
debtor who wants to tithe can restrict personal expenses for such items as clothing, 
travel, and recreation in order to increase charitable contributions). 
93. To the contrary, the recent Welfare Reform Legislation has the effect of depriv-
ing some poor people of all benefits, including benefits that provide food for their chil-
dren. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, § 211, 110 Stat. 2105 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1382c (West Supp. 1997)). 
94. The court's accusation in In re Tinneberg, 59 B.R. 634, 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
1986), that a creditor's objection to a newspaper subscription in a Chapter 13 budget 
was "downright heartless" is unfair. That a court decides that purchasing a newspaper 
for recreational purposes or watching cable television is not economically necessary does 
not mean that the court is prohibiting "debtors in bankruptcy from buying a newspaper." 
Id. at 635. A court's conclusion that debtors do not have a right to make non·essential 
expenditures only means that if the debtor wants to purchase the paper she must make 
sacrifices in other areas of her life-just like poor people are forced to do every day of 
their lives. 
95. It is possible, of course, that debtors will attempt to hide non-necessary items in 
their proposed budget. Moreover, because reasonable is a subjective concept, debtors and 
creditors may not have the same view of that term. There is an administratively simple 
and efficient way to handle both of these issues. Because Chapter 13 trustees have rou-
tinely reviewed and courts have routinely approved Chapter 13 budgets, they have the 
expertise to uncover unreasonable expenses for food, clothing, etc. Chapter 13 trustees 
assess the reasonableness of budgets based on regional cost·of-living standards. In addi-
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properly allocated funds to buy steak or spam. 
2. Lifestyle Choices That Benefit the Debtor's Legal Depen-
dents. There is neither a policy nor statutory justification for 
courts to approve a non-necessary expenditure simply because 
the expense is consistent with the lifestyle to which the debtor 
was accustomed before she filed for ba:D.k:i-uptcy.96 By protecting 
a debtor's right to maintain her pre-petition lifestyle, bank-
ruptcy courts tacitly imply that the debtor has done nothing to 
cause her financial difficulties and accordingly, should not be 
forced to alter her (or her legal dependent's) lifestyle in the light 
of those difficulties. This analysis, analogous to the reasoning 
used when state courts decide alimony and child support dis-
putes,97 is inappropriat~ when applied to bankruptcy lifestyle 
examinations. 
When state court judges fashion child support awards, they 
are careful not to make the children of divorcing parents "suffer" 
financially simply because their parents choose not to remain a 
family unit.98 For this reason, parents are required to provide fi-
nancial support for their children in an amount sufficient to 
maintain the children's pre-divorce lifestyle even if doing so 
tion, Chapter 13 trustees frequently evaluate proposed budgets in the light of informa-
tion the trustee acquires at the meeting of creditors required by 11 U.S.C. § 341. Tele-
phone Interview with Frank Santoro, Chapter 13 Standing Trustee, E.D. Va. (Jan. 30, 
1997). If either courts or trustees need an objective standard by which to compare their 
views of what constitutes reasonable expenses, they can rely on the Consumer Expendi-
ture Survey, an annual Department of Labor publication that presents average expendi-
tures by region for several categories of spending, including housing, food, transporta-
tion, and health care. See U.S. DEp'T OF LABoR, CONSUMER ExPENDITURE SURVEY, 1992-
1993 (1995). 
If the Trustee concludes that a debtor has padded a food or clothing budget in an at-
tempt to hide discretionary expenditures, the court can refuse to confirm the plan until 
the debtor eliminates the extravagant or discretionary expense. See, e.g., Pollak, supra · 
note 6, at 579 ("[T]he subjective smell test, good faith test, clean hands test, and 'I know 
it when I see it' perception are still appropriate abuse detectors in the hands of credi-
tors, [t]rustees, and judges."). 
96. See In re Jones, 55 B.R. 462, 466 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (finding that a debtor 
is entitled to basic living expenses sufficient to sustain the basic needs, not those needs 
related to the lifestyle to which the debtor is accustomed). 
97. Cf. Sheryl L. Scheible, Defining "Support" Under Bankruptcy Law: Revitalization 
of the "Necessaries" Doctrine, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1, 57-58 (1988) (arguing that courts 
should focus on the pre-divorce lifestyle of the debtor and his dependents when deter-
mining the needs of the respective parties). 
98. Luciani v. Montemurro-Luciani (In re Luciani), 544 N.W.2d 561, 567 (Wis. 1996) 
(considering whether "financially, the children would ... be reduced to a lower living 
standard than that enjoyed during the marriage" when determining an appropriate child 
support amount). 
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means the parents must make sacrifices in their own lifestyle. 
However, unlike a child who is a third-party bystander to the 
disintegration of his parents' marriage, the debtor actively par-
ticipated in the disintegration of her finances. As a result, while 
it may be appropriate for state court judges to refuse to force a 
child to radically alter his lifestyle simply because his parents 
divorced, it is appropriate to force a debtor to radically alter her 
lifestyle since her decision to file for bankruptcy proves that she 
can no longer afford that lifestyle. 
At first blush, the debtor's legal dependents appear analo-
gous to the children of divorcing parents. If true, approving ex-
penditures for a debtor's children's pre-petition lifestyle should 
be permitted even if elements of that lifestyle are not necessary. 
The critical distinction between the rights of the children of a 
married debtor and those of a divorced non-debtor is the person 
required to make sacrifices. The creditors of a divorcing couple 
are not required to sacrifice being repaid simply because the 
parents are required to maintain their children's pre-divorce 
lifestyle. Instead, the parents themselves are required to make 
sacrifices in their post-divorce lifestyle in order to preserve their 
children's pre-divorce lifestyle. The same burden of sacrifice 
should be true if the parent is a debtor. If debtors want to pre-
serve their child's pre-petition lifestyle, they must be prepared 
to make sacrifices in their post-petition lifestyles including pos-
sibly curtailing their expenditures on economically necessary 
items like food or clothing. 
If a divorced debtor's child support payments include funds 
for non-necessary expenditures (like private school), the child 
would be entitled to keep t.his non-necessary benefit because the 
debtor has a legal duty to make these payments. 99 Since the 
children of a divorced debtor would have the right to private 
school tuition payments, while the children of a married debtor 
would not have that right, some might argue that this would en-
courage some debtors to consider getting a divorce, entering into 
a child support agreement that obligates one or both parties to 
pay the private school (or college) tuition of her children, and 
then filing for bankruptcy.100 The risk posed by this potential 
99. In general, child support payments can be decreased only if a parent or author-
ized government officer petitions the applicable state court for a modification of the child 
support order. See VA. CODE .ANN. § 20-108 (Michie 1995). Such a court could also act sua 
sponte. Id. 
100. In years past, some married taxpayers divorced in December then remarried in 
January to avoid the "marriage penalty" of the Internal Revenue Code. The marriage 
penalty causes most two-income spouses to be taxed in the aggregate in a greater 
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loophole is negligible for three reasons. 
First, some courts currently will not permit debtors to pay 
college expenses or private, secondary school tuition for their 
children.101 This incentive already exists, if debtors know of and 
are willing to disrupt their family life to take advantage of this 
loophole. Second, to take advantage of this loophole, the finan-
cially strapped member of a married couple who is considering 
filing for bankruptcy must calculate that she can file for and get 
a divorce before her creditors can .seize all her assets.102 Since 
some states require parties to wait for up to a year before their 
divorce is final, 103 it will be impossible logistically for most debt-
ors to preserve their assets until the divorce is final. 
Finally, if a debtor divorces her spouse, agrees to pay her 
child's private school or college tuition as part of her child sup-
port obligations, then files -for bankruptcy solely to finance that 
education at her creditors' expense, the child support payments 
might be deemed to be fraudulent conveyances. That is, if a 
creditor can prove that the debtor divorced and agreed to pay 
educational fees solely to avoid using those funds to repay her 
creditors, the Trustee might be allowed to recover any payments 
made within one year of filing.104 In short, given the timing diffi-
culties and the potential for the divorce/bankruptcy arrange-
ment to be deemed fraudulent, the number of debtors who could 
take advantage of this loophole would be insignificant. 
Courts should not force creditors to subsidize a debtor's de-
sire to preserve either her or her legal dependents' pre-petition 
amount than if they filed separate income tax returns as unmarried taxpayers. Boyter v. 
Commissioner, 668 F.2d 1382, 1384 (4th Cir. 1981). The Internal Revenue Service has 
now closed this loophole, will view such divorces as sham transactions, and will deem 
the spouses to be married even though they obtained a legal divorce. See Rev. Rul. 76-
255, 1976-2 C.B. 40. 
101. See cases cited supra note 84; see also infra notes 128, 132 & 134. 
102. As the authors of the leading comprehensive empirical study of consumer 
bankruptcies have noted: 
Debtors on the verge of a bankruptcy filing are under enormous pressure from 
their creditors. They are often filled with anxiety and self-loathing. There may 
be terrific tension in their homes, and they know very little about bank-
ruptcy •.. their lack of information [does] not leave them in a position to 'cal-
culate' much of anything, except that the next paycheck will not stretch around 
even the most pressing payment demands. 
SULUVAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 244. 
103. See VA. CODE .ANN. § 20-121 (Michie 1995) (one year waiting period for a couple 
with children); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.01() (1993) (same). 
104. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1). In addition, this scheme may be considered a fraudulent 
conveyance under applicable state law. See, e.g., U.S. v. Mongelli, 857 F. Supp., 18, 21 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
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lifestyle. Because the bankruptcy filing itself proves the debtor 
can no longer afford her pre-petition lifestyle, she should be 
forced to make post-petition lifestyle sacrifices. Similarly, if a 
debtor wants her legal dependents to continue to maintain a 
lavish lifestyle, the debtor (not the creditor) must be prepared to 
make post-petition sacrifices-including foregoing necessary 
items-to ensure that the dependents' pre-petition lifestyle is 
preserved post-petition.1os 
3. Lifestyle Choices That Prevent Debtors From Funding a 
Chapter 13 Plan. Because the Chapter 7 estate does not include 
a debtor's post-petition wages and Chapter 7 cases typically are 
closed fairly quickly, 106 creditors rarely challenge a Chapter 7 
debtor's proposed post-petition lifestyle. However, a debtor who 
has the ability to fund a Chapter 13 plan, but instead exercises 
her option to discharge her debts by filing a Chapter 7 petition, 
presents a textbook example of a debtor's ability to abuse the 
bankruptcy system.107 For creditors, a debtor who is unwilling to 
105. I recognize that, in addition to creating the get-a-divorce-then-flle-bankruptcy 
incentive, the standard proposed in this Article potentially creates an educational oppor-
tunity disparity between the children of married and divorced debtors. That is, since a 
divorced debtor would be required to continue making court-ordered child support pay-
ments that included private school tuition, the children of a divorced debtor would have 
the "right" to attend private school whereas the children of a happily-married debtor 
would not. While this result might seem unfair, this disparity already exists between the 
children of rich people (who can afford private school tuition payments) and poor people 
(who most like1y cannot send their children to private school). Since neither the state 
nor federal legislatures have deemed attending private school to be an unalienable right, 
the Code should not be used to advance the social policy either of preferring private 
schools or of ensuring all children receive the same educational benefits. See, e.g., San 
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (declining to find that education 
is a fundamental right). Moreover, even if the proposal detrimentally affects the children 
of divorced debtors, the proposal is consistent with the Code's policy of protecting debt-
ors' (not their dependents') right to a fresh start. See In re Jarrell, 189 B.R. 374, 376 
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1995). 
106. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 26-30 (describing process of a simple 
Chapter 7 case). 
107. See In re Davidoff, 185 B.R. 631, 636 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995). The court ex-
pressed disgust that the debtor "d[id] not appear to be suffering" and instead was treat-
ing bankruptcy as "a method whereby yuppies and other afiluent persons may serenely 
and luxuriously cruise down the river of life without modification or disturbance of their 
far above average afiluent lifestyle and, with barely a ripple, wash themselves clear of 
debt by the flling of a bankruptcy petition." I d. See also In re Barnes, 158 B.R. 105, 109 
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1993) (dismissing case for substantial abuse because to do otherwise 
would cause "the public [to] perceive Chapter 7 bankruptcy as an easy way out of unnec-
essary consumer debt."); but see In re Tanenbaum, 210 B.R. 182 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997) 
(finding that the debtors acted in bad faith by refusing to moderate their extravagant 
lifestyle, but nonetheless were entitled to a Chapter 7 discharge because the trustee 
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sacrifice non-necessary, post-petition lifestyle choices is not enti-
tled to any bankruptcy relief. 
Either the Trustee or the court108 can move to dismiss a 
Chapter 7 case if the court concludes that allowing a debtor 
with primarily consumer debts109 to discharge those debts would 
be a "substantial abuse" of the Code.110 Section 109(b) of the 
Code provides that any "person"111 may file for relief under 
Chapter 7 regardless of the amount of debt or the debtor's abil-
ity to repay some debts through future income.112 Thus, despite 
the appearance of "abuse," the Code allows debtors to economi-
cally harm their creditors by refusing to attempt to repay their 
debts. 
Though it economically harms creditors when debtors 
choose to continue making economically non-necessary choices 
rather than repay their debts, 113 most commentators have con-
cluded that conditioning Chapter 7 relief on a debtor's willing-
ness (or ability) to fund a Chapter 13 plan effectively allows 
creditors to circumvent the Code's prohibition against involun-
tary· Chapter 13 filings. 114 In contrast, courts are split over 
failed to timely file a motion to dismiss the debtors' case). 
108. Creditors cannot request that the court dismiss a case for "substantial abuse" 
even if the debtor has the ability, but refuses, to fund a Chapter 13 plan. See 11 U.S. C. 
§ 707(b) (1994). 
109. Consumer debts are those incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, 
family, or household purpose. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (1994). 
110. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994). Section 707(a) also allows courts to dismiss cases for 
"cause." Some courts have relied on section 707(b) to dismiss cases when the debtor has 
the ability to repay some debts, but refuses to fund a Chapter 13 plan. See Fonder v. 
United States, 974 R2d 996, 998 (8th Cir. 1992); In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 914 (9th Cir. 
1988). . 
111. Excluded from the definition are railroads and certain financial institutions. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1994). 
112. See id. In contrast, Chapter 13 debtors can have no more than $250,000 in un-
secured debts and $750,000 in secured debts. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1994). 
113. See, e.g., In re Spagnolia, 199 B.R. 362, 364 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1995) (discussing 
a budget that proposes monthly expenses for charitable contributions and a full-time 
nanny); In re Vumese, 192 B.R. 61, 71-72 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing budget that 
proposes $250 per month to purchase life insurance with a $2 million death benefit and 
to lease a new automobile); In re Gyurci, 95 B.R. 639, 643 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989) (dis-
cussing budget that includes expenses for housekeeper, cable television, five family cars, 
and payments for private school and college tuition for children); In re Ploegert, 93 B.R. 
641, 643 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988) (discussing budget that proposes $840 for entertain-
ment and dining out weekly and camping and weekend trips to California, Wisconsin, 
and Chicago); In re Warfield, 80 B.R. 898, 899-900 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (discussing 
budget that proposes custom-made clothes and eating out every night). 
114. Only wage earning debtors may file Chapter 13 petitions. See 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 109(e), 303(a) (1994); see also Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 165 (1991); S. REP. No. 
95-989, at 32 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5818 ("Short of involuntary 
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whether a debtor's ability (but refusal) to repay some of his 
debts, standing alone, justifies dismissing the Chapter 7 case. 
While two Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that a debtor's 
ability (but refusal) to pay in itself justifies dismissal for sub-
stantial abuse, 115 most courts apply a totality of the circum-
stances test when deciding whether the debtor's ability to pay 
warrants dismissal for substantial abuse.116 
While the legislative history of § 707(b) does not clearly 
favor either position, 117 Congress previously has refused to con-
dition the ·availability of Chapter 7 relief on a debtor's willing-
ness to repay his debts.118 Moreover, given the importance of the 
fresh start policy119 and Congress' unwillingness to permit invol-
untary Chapter 13 petitions, it is unlikely that Congress in-
tended courts to dismiss Chapter 7 cases simply because an 
honest, but poor, debtor refuses to attempt to repay his debts.120 
servitude, it is difficult to keep a debtor working for his creditors when he does not want 
to pay them back."); Hon. Roger M. Whelan, et al., Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: Bal-
ancing the Equities in Chapter 13, 2 AM. BANKR. !NST. L. REv. 165, 190 (Spring 1994) 
(noting dismissal of a Chapter 7 case for abuse may constitute an involuntary Chapter 
13 mechanism); Gross, supra note 31, at 98-102; Limiting Access, supra note 39 at 1133-
35; A Charlene Sullivan, Reply: Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge, 1984 WIS. L. 
REv. 1069, 1077-78 (1984) [hereinafter Reply]; Rejoinder, supra note 91 at 1088. 
115. See United States Trustee v. Harris, 960 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1992); Zolg v. Kelly 
(In re Kelly), 841 R2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988). 
116, See Green v. Staples (In re Green), 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Krohn, 
886 R2d 123 (6th Cir. 1989). See, e.g., In re Piontek, 113 B.R. 17, 22 (Bankr. D. Or. 1990) 
(suggesting courts generally dismiss Chapter 7 cases for substantial abuse when debtor 
can pay unsecured debts within three years in Chapter 13, even though doing so disre-
gards legislative history prohibition against an involuntary Chapter 13); In re Edwards, 
50 B.R. 933 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
117. In discussing the various approaches used by the circuits, one court noted that 
"[e]ach side looks to legislative history in support of their respective positions. Such his-
tory, however, is sorely lacking." In re Ontiveros, 198 B.R. 284, 288 (C.D. ill. 1996). 
118. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 94 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C..A.N. 5787, 5880 
("The section does not contemplate, however, that the ability of the debtor to repay his 
debts in whole or in part constitutes adequate cause for dismissal."); see also Gross, 
supra note 31, at 79-80 nn. 76-78 (discussing Congress' refusal to change the Code to de-
prive debtors of their right to liquidate assets and start afresh in Chapter 7). 
119. See Suu.lvAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 20: 
The notion of beginning anew, of rebirth, lies near the center of our restless, 
westward-moving culture and is also the central proposition of its dominant re-
ligions. Whether a bankrupt debtor, given more time, can pay in full or can 
pay little or nothing, the relaxation of strict legal obligations is the indispensa-
ble centerpiece of .American bankruptcy law. 
120. One might argue that a truly "honest" debtor would attempt to repay his debts 
even if he had no legal obligation to do so. See generally SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 24, 
at 8 ("Rebirth and a fresh start lie at the heart of our national mystique [about bank-
ruptcy] and many of our religious beliefs. But we do not admire broken promises, and 
we fear those who would avoid hard work by taking advantage of our compassion."). If 
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Given these policy considerations and the current Code provi-
sions designed to curb abusive ·filings, 121 courts should dismiss 
Chapter 7 cases only if the debtor's pre-petition actions indicate 
that, post-petition, the debtor is not acting in good faith. 122 • 
Courts should not penalize Chapter 7 debtors who refuse to 
rep~y their debts simply because the court disagrees with Con-
gress' decision123 to give debtors the option of filing under either 
Chapter 7 or 13. If the only indication that a debtor is acting in 
"bad faith" is his refusal to sacrifice future non-essential lifes-
tyle items, the refusal, standing alone, should not be grounds to 
dismiss the Chapter 7 petition.124 Instead, as long as the debtor 
this is true, then every defendant who raises the expiration of the statute of limitations 
as an affirmative defense to an otherwise meritorious claim would be "dishonest." 
121. For example, courts can dismiss a Chapter 7 petition if a debtor fraudulently 
transferred or removed property during the year prior to the filing. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 727(a)(2)(A) (1994). Likewise, courts can refuse to discharge certain debts if the Chap-
ter 7 debtor engaged in a "credit buying spree" in contemplation of filing bankruptcy. See 
11 US.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (1994). Finally, if the debtor's bankruptcy schedules fail to com-
pletely and accurately disclose all relevant financial data-indicating that the debtor 
currently is attempting to hide nonexempt pre-petition property rather than giving it to 
the Trustee-courts can dismiss the case. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(D) (1994); see Thaler v. 
Erdheim (In re Erdheim), 197 B.R. 23 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996); Ramsay v. Jones (In re 
Jones), 175 B.R. 994 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994); Nof v. Gannon (In re Gannon), 173 B.R. 
313 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Roberson, 154 B.R. 536 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993); Nissel-
son v. Wolfson (In re Wolfson), 152 B.R. 830 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); Davis v. Davenport 
(In re Davenport), 147 B.R. 172 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ross-
miller (In re Rossmiller), 140 B.R. 1000 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992); Morton v. Dreyer (In re 
Dreyer), 127 B.R. 587 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991); Wortman v. Ridley (In re Ridley), 115 B.R. 
731 (Bankr. D. ~s. 1990); Nassau Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Trinsey (In re Trinsey), 114 
B.R. 86 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); Compton v. Powers (In re Powers), 112 B.R. 184 (Bankr. 
S.D. Tex. 1989); Wendel v. Kent (In re Kent), 92 B.R. 540 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988); B.K 
Medical Sys., Inc. Pension Plan v. Roberts (In re Roberts), 81 B.R. 354 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
1987); Noble v. Renner (In re Renner); 45 B.R. 414 (Bankr. D. Md. 1984); Rafoth v. Chi-
mento (In re Chimento), 43 B.R. 401 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); City Nat'! Bank of Miami 
v. Savel (In re Savel), 29 B.R. 854 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); In re McDonald, 25 B.R. 186 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); Wendel v. Kapsos (In re Kapsos), 16 B.R. 280 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1981); Wendel v. Sharpe (In re Sharpe), 16 B.R. 226 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981). 
122. See In re Higuera, 199 B.R. 196, 201 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996) ("In order for a 
debtor's petition to be dismissed for substantial f!.buse, there must exist some egregious 
conduct, bad faith, overreaching, unjust enrichment, or substantial profit on the part of 
the debtor.") 
123. It is not the goal of this Article to determine whether Congress should force 
debtors to pay their debts if they have the ability to do .so. Instead, this Article argues 
that, unless and until Congress imposes an ability to pay requirement, courts should al-
low debtors to take advantage of the benefits afforded by Chapter 7 even if doing so per-
mits debtors to make future, economically non-necessary choices that economically harm 
creditors. 
124. See In re Watkins, 210 B.R. 394, 402 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997) (the court refused 
to find that the debtors' failure to alter their lifestyle post-petition establishes bad faith 
in the filing of their cases). 
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is "honest"125 and is willing to sacrifice all pre-petition nonex-
empt property, the court should grant the discharge-even if do-
ing so perpetuates the perception that debtors can avoid debt re-
·payment with little or no disruption of their future spending 
habits.126 
B. Lifestyle Choice!$_ that do not Yield Tangible Economic 
Benefits to the Debtor 
The Code allows debtors to financially support themselves 
and their dependents-even ·though this prevents them from re-
paying their debts. Frequently, however, debtors will seek to 
give financial support to family members who are not their legal 
dependents. Because using money to support non-legal depen-
dents does not provide direct economic benefits to the debtor, 
courts should not allow debtors to base their inability to pay 
their debts on their desire to support non-legal dependents. 
Moreover, it is inconsistent with the Code's policy of treating 
similarly situated creditors equally to let the debtor divert 
money from creditors to non-creditor non-legal dependents. 
Courts tend to permit this lifestyle choice, believing it to be 
a noble one. Even if the debtor's choice to financially support 
non-legal dependents or third-party organizations is well-
intentioned, results from the debtor's "moral" obligation to those 
relatives or organizations, and gives the debtor tangible, emo-
tional benefits, courts should not force creditors to subsidize 
moral obligations. To emphasize that the Code is designed to 
govern the relationship between debtors, their legal dependents, 
and creditors, I further propose .that Congress amend Code Sec-
tions 101, 522, and 1325 of the Code to emphasize that debtors 
have the right to support only legal dependents, even if other 
family members in fact depend on them. 
125. A debtor's honesty is frequently overshadowed by whether the debtor looks 
"needy." Thus, while the court in In re Ontiveros, 198 B.R. 284, 291 (Bankr. C.D. ill. 
1996) conceded that the debtor was honest, it nonetheless dismissed the debtor's Chap-
ter 7 petition because the debtor was "non-needy" and had "the ability to live comforta-
bly and to pay off a substantial portion of his unsecured debts." See Gross, supra note 
31, at 98-102 (arguing that courts narrowly construe§ 707(b) and dismiss cases only if a 
dishonest debtor has engaged in fraudulent or intentionally misleading acts). 
126. For a particularly sharp debate on the potential economic harm caused by 
granting Chapter 7 discharges to consumer debtors who can repay a substantial percent-
age of their debts from future income, see Limiting Access, supra note 39; Reply, supra 
note 114; Rejoinder, supra note 91. 
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1. Choices That Benefit A Debtor's Non-Legal Dependents. 
Some courts have gauged Chapter 13 debtors' necessary ex-
penses based on the needs of the debtors' non-legal depen-
dents.127 For example, the debtors in In re Riegodedios128 sought 
to pay college tuition and rent expenses for their adult daughter. 
Rather than asking whether allowing the debtors to financially 
support an adult who was not legally dependent on them was 
consistent with bankruptcy policy, the court instead character-
ized the creditor's objection to the budget as seeking a "pound of 
flesh."129 The court allowed the tuition and rent expenses for two 
primary reasons. 
First, the court observed that the plan satisfied the "best-in-
terests-of-creditors test" because it gave creditors more than 
they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation.130 Although this 
was true, it also was irrelevant. The Code requires that Chapter 
13 debtors both give creditors more than they would receive in a 
hypothetical Chapter 7 case and use all disposable income to 
fund the plan.131 That a debtor satisfies one requirement does 
not excuse the debtor from satisfying the other one. 
Second, the court viewed the proposed expenditure as a 
non-luxury item. In the court's view, a college education is "ben-
eficial" and, because the daughter attended a state school, this 
particular educational expenditure was not all that expensive.132 
127. The budget of an individual who files for relief under Chapter 11 is not scruti-
nized as closely as the budget of a Chapter 13 debtor. In general, Chapter 11 debtors 
may enter into transactions, including the sale or lease of property of the estate, in the 
ordinary course of business without obtaining court permission. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) 
(1994). Because a Chapter 11 individual debtor's personal expenses are part of the ordi-
nary course of the debtor's business, creditors would not have the right to object to those 
expenses unless the expenses are so extravagant as to warrant seeking the appointment 
of a Chapter 11 Trustee or having the case converted to Chapter 7. See In re Bradley, 
185 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995). 
128. 146 B.R. 691 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992). 
129. Id. at 693. 
130. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1994). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1994) (outlining 
Chapter 11's best interest of creditors requirement). Unless the creditor provides evi-
dence to the contrary, courts generally will assume that unsecured creditors will receive 
nothing in a Chapter 7 case. See In re Joliet-Will County Community Action Agency, 847 
F.2d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 1988). 
131. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1994) (outlining the best interest of creditors re-
quirement); 11 U.S.C. § 1325{b)(1)(B) (1994) (disposable income requirement). 
132. The court also seemed to believe that, because the daughter was in her a se-
nior year at V1rginia Polytechnical Institute, the expense was necessary given the alter-
natives "at this late stage." In re Riegodedios, 146 B.R. at 693. Cf. In re Conner, 89 B.R. 
744, 749 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (finding that a Chapter 7 debtor's decision to financially 
support her adult daughters' decisions to attend out-of-state and private colleges was 
self-imposed and not in good faith because "[t]he State of Illinois has one of the finest 
658 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
However, rather than asking whether the proposed expenditure 
was consistent with any bankruptcy policy, the court instead 
pronounced that the expenditure was good as a matter of social 
policy: "Do we need a psychologist or a sociologist to demon-
strate that this helps build good family life?"133 
The court never explained why debtors should be allowed to 
provide economic support for someone who is not their legal de-
pendent when providing that support economically harms credi-
tors. Even if the court correctly concluded that the expenditure 
gave the adult daughter a "fresh start," creditors should not be 
forced to forfeit debt repayment so that debtors, their legal de-
pendents, and other non-dependent family members can receive 
fresh starts. Although the court may be right that allo,ving the 
daughter to finish college would make the "young lady become a 
more productive, useful citizen," the court never explained why 
the debtors' creditors, as opposed to society at large, should be 
forced to subsidize this civic venture.l34 
2. Lifestyle Choices That Prevent Chapter 7 Deb~ors From 
Repaying Their Debts So They Can Support Non-Legal Depen-
dents. Rather than using their income to fund a Chapter 13 
plan, some Chapter 7 debtors have attempted to use that in-
come to support non-legal dependents. For example, the debtors 
in In re Wegner135 intended to use their future income to finan-
cially support their two adult children, their ex-daughter-in-law, 
and their grandchildren. Without asking whether creditors 
should be forced to subsidize such a lifestyle choice, the court 
concluded that the debtors "were motivated by charity and a 
sense of moral, if not legal, responsibility for their family," and 
because they were not attempting to "enrich themselves or de-
prive their creditors."136 Because the court felt that, without the 
discharge, the debtors "would never recover financially," the 
court granted the discharge.1a7 
state college systems in the United States"). 
133. In re Riegodedios, 146 B.R. at 693. 
134. Id. See also In re Jones, 55 B.R. 462, 467 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (fmding that 
a debtor's budgeted payments for his son's college tuition were unnecessary because 
"[a]n expensive private school education is not a basic need of the Debtor's dependents, 
particularly in view of the high quality public education available in this country .... "). 
135. 91 B.R. 854 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988). 
136. Id. at 859. The court allowed this lifestyle choice even though the debtors' ef-
forts to "financially assist their family lead [sic], in part, to the debtors' substantial 
credit card debt," and ultimately, to their need to file for bankruptcy. Id. 
137. Id. at 860. 
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The court in In re Richmond138 reached an opposite result. 
The debtors in this case also sought to discharge their debts in 
Chapter 7 and intended to use their future income to support 
family members who were not their legal dependents.139 This 
court denied the lifestyle choice, reasoning that the debtors' 
creditors should not be forced "to contribute to the voluntary 
support of family members who are not dependents of 
debtors . . . ."140 
As previously discussed, Congress gives debtors the option 
of either surrendering most of their property and discharging 
some of their debts in Chapter 7, or keeping most of their prop-
erly and repaying some of their debts in Chapter 13. As Con-
gress gives debtors this option, courts should not deny a debtor 
a Chapter 7 discharge merely because it concludes that debtors 
should fund a Chapter 13 plan rather than make future non-
necessary choices. However, while debtors have the right to re-
fuse to fund a Chapter 13 plan, courts should not allow debtors 
to bolster their eligibility for relief under Chapter 7 on their 
moral obligations to non-legal dependents. 
3. Lifestyle Choices That Prevent Debtors From Repaying 
Presumptively Non-Dischargeable Debts In Order To Support 
Non-Legal Dependents. Both Chapter 7 and 13 debtors have at-
tempted to discharge presumptively non-dischargeable student 
loans so they can financially support non-legal dependents. Spe-
cifically, debtors have sought to discharge student loan debt by 
claiming that it would be an undue hardship for them to both 
repay the debt and support their family members.141 If the loan 
138. 144 B.R. 539 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1992). 
139. Id. at 541. 
140. Id. at 542. Another reason for the court's denial of the discharge was the 
debtor's attempt to keep a motor home that was a recreational vehicle, not their primary 
residence. Id. See In re Davidoff, 185 B.R. 631, 635-36 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) (dis-
missing the Chapter 7 petition because the debtor intended to support his adult children 
and his second wife's child even though his wife received substantial child support pay-
ments from the child's biological father); United States v. Bacco (In re Bacco), 160 B.R. 
283, 289 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993) (dismissing a Chapter 7 petition in which the debtor 
proposed to pay a debt for which his father was also liable); In re Peluso, 72 B.R. 732, 
738 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) (dismissing a Chapter 7 petition in which the debtor pro-
posed to subsidize the automobile insurance and the monthly telephone charges attrib-
uted to his emancipated, employed son). · 
141. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A) & (B) (1994). As the "necessity of careful budgeting is 
not evidence of undue hardship," courts typically prevent debtors from discharging stu-
dent loans when they intentionally or voluntarily made extravagant or excessive lifestyle 
choices that created the hardship. New York State Higher Educ. Services Corp. v. Brock 
(In re Brock), 4 B.R. 491, 494 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
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repayment period started less than seven years before the 
debtor filed for bankruptcy, a debtor cannot discharge student 
loan debt unless she shows that (1) based on her current income 
and expenses, she cannot maintain a "minimal" standard of liv-
ing for herself and her dependents if she were forced to repay 
the loan; (2) her inability to repay the loans without sacrificing 
the necessities of life is likely to persist for a significant portion 
of the loan repayment period, and (3) she made a good faith ef-
fort to repay the loan before she filed for bankruptcy.142 
Some courts ·have allowed debtors to financially support 
non-legal dependents rather than pay presumptively dischargea-
ble debts. 143 While other courts have denied that lifestyle 
choice, 144 the court in Melton v. New York State Higher Educa-
tion Services Corporation (In re Melton)145 is one of the few that 
unequivocally distinguishes between a debtor's moral and legal 
obligations to her extended family. While the holding is consis-
tent with the standard of permitting debtors to make only those 
lifestyle choices that provide tangible, necessary, economic bene-
fits to the debtor, it is unclear whether the court was motivated 
142. This three-factor test initially was stated in Brunner v. New York State Higher 
Educ. Serv. Corp., (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 756 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 831 
F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987). Most courts apply this test, or a variant thereof. See Rice v. 
Unites States (In re Rice), 78 F.3d 1144, 1149 (6th Cir. 1996); Pennsylvania Higher 
Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 302-03 (3d Cir. 1995); Wood-
cock v. Chemical Bank (In re Woodcock), 45 F.3d 363, 367 (lOth Cir. 1995); see also In re 
Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136-37 (7th Cir. 1993) (adopting Brunner test, but giving 
courts the right to suspend loan repayment, rather than immediately and completely 
discharging the loan debt). 
143. For example, the debtor in Clay v. Westmar College (In re Clay) sought a loan 
hardship discharge because he wanted to financially support his retired mother and un-
employed father. 12 B.R. 251, 254 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1981). While there was no indica-
tion in this case that the debtor's proposed budget contained extravagant items, there 
also was no indication that he was legally obligated to support his parents. Because the 
debtor could "barely support himself and his parents, not to mention repayment of 
loans," the court allowed the debtor to divert funds from debt repayment, effectively forc-
ing his creditors to subsidize his lifestyle choice to support non-legal dependents. Id.; see 
also Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750, 755 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (finding that the 
debtor's decision to support two children for whom he had no legal obligation did not 
constitute a luxurious lifestyle "in the 'big picture' analysis of the case"). 
144. See Coveney v. Costep Servicing Agent (In re Coveney), 192 B.R. 140 (Bankr. 
W.D. Tex. 1996), in which the court held that the debtor was not entitled to a loan hard-
ship discharge because she consciously chose to move to a small town to care for her 
mother rather than seek a higher paying job in a larger town. The court accepted the 
debtor's contention that her efforts to care for her mother were "unselfish," but still 
ruled that "her moral obligation to a family member, who is not a dependent, does not 
take priority over her legal obligation to repay her educational loans." Id. at 144. 
145. 187 B.R. 98 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995). 
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by its desire to prevent harm to creditors or its disapproval of 
the debtor's non-traditional living arrangement. 
The debtor in Melton shared living expenses with his girl-
friend and was considered a "combined" case with the girlfriend 
and her two children for public assistance purposes.146 The 
debtor argued that it would be an undue hardship for him to re-
pay a student loan and also maintain a minimal standard of liv-
ing. While conceding that his current underemployment most 
likely was not permanent, the debtor maintained that it would 
be economically detrimental for him to accept a slightly higher 
paying job because any salary increase would be offset by a de-
crease in public benefits and an increase in his child support ob-
ligations for his own child (who did not live with him).147 
There was no indication that the debtor's living arrange-
ment violated either state or federal welfare laws. Nonetheless, 
the court clearly disapproved of the debtor's choice to combine 
his financial affairs with his girlfriend "as if his household were 
a traditional family" and disapproved of the debtor's attempt to 
link his chosen lifestyle to his inability to repay his student 
loans.148 The court especially found troubling: 
the notion that any idiosyncracies of public assistance programs or child 
support contribution requirements which might impede the ability of the 
Debtor to improve his net household income may also actually help him 
prove that his circumstances will not improve, thus assisting him in dis-
charging what is normally a non-dischargeable debt.149 
Whereas the Melton court was unwilling to acknowledge 
that a debtor's increased earnings potentially could deprive the 
debtor of income needed for survival (i.e., public assistance bene-
fits), at least one court was willing to consider the relationship 
between public assistance benefits and increased earnings. The 
court in In re Vazquez150 was sympathetic to the debtors' claim 
that taking a slightly higher-paying job most likely would cause 
the female debtor to lose food stamps and other welfare benefits 
and would decrease the family's household income.151 Although 
the debtors in Vazquez certainly seemed eligible for a hardship 
discharge, one suspects that the court's decision to discharge the 
146. The debtor relied in part on his girlfriend's public assistance to meet his daily 
needs. Id. at 100-01. 
147. Id. at 101. 
148. Id. at 102. 
149. Id. at 102. 
150. 194 B.R. 677 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996). 
151. Id. at 680. 
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debt was heavily influenced by the fact that the debtors were a 
"decent well-intended" couple "subsisting below the poverty 
level."152 Likewise, one suspects that the Melton court's decision 
not to discharge the debt was influenced by the fact that it was 
dealing with a single, healthy debtor who was cohabitating with 
his girlfriend and her two children.1sa 
The Melton court maintained that, despite its obvious disap-
proval of the debtor's non-traditional lifestyle, the primary issue 
was not one of morality, decency, or even "family values," but 
was a""simple distinction between choice and legal obligation."154 
If the court genuinely was not influenced by morality or family 
values, then it should have granted the discharge-even if it be-
lieved the debtor's lifestyle was slothful or sinful-if, in fact, the 
debtor could show that living with his girlfriend and her chil-
dren was an economic necessity. It is unclear from the facts of 
the case whether the debtor or the non-legal dependents benefit-
ted more as a result of their being treated as a "combined case." 
If the debtor could prove that he could maintain a minimal 
standard of living only by being linked with his girlfriend and 
her children, then his relationship with them would be one of 
economic necessity, not choice. If removing himself from this 
concededly non-traditional living arrangement would cause him 
to fall even deeper into debt, then despite any disapproval of 
this lifestyle, the court should have granted the hardship 
discharge. 
If a debtor manipulates bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy 
laws out of economic necessity, courts should not penalize the 
debtor merely because it disapproves of the result of the manip-
ulation. Even if allowing a debtor to manipulate the idiosyncra-
cies of public assistance is distasteful, this is no more objection-
able than allowing debtors to "manipulate" the idiosyncracies of 
state exemption laws and the Code, thereby giving them the 
right to keep expensive parcels of land or retirement accounts.155 
152. Id. 
153. See also In re Mastromarino, 197 B.R. 171, 178 (Banltr. D. Me. 1996) (finding 
that the debtor's "choice to live with and support his domestic partner and her four chil-
dren" did not warrant giving expenses relating to that lifestyle choice priority over his 
obligations to his creditors.) 
154. 187 B.R. at 103. The opinion contained no suggestion that the financial ar-
rangement between the debtor and his girlfriend was fraudulent or otherwise prohibited 
by the rules of the public assistance agencies. Indeed, the court was willing to assume 
the debtor's motive in helping his girlfriend and her children to be "altruistic, even no-
ble" for the purposes of the opinion. Id. at 104. 
155. See McDaniel v. McDaniel (In re McDaniel II), 70 F.3d 841, 844 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(arguing that a single debtor (widowed by his wife) with no dependent children "consti-
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Nor is it any more objectionable than allowing debtors to "ma-
nipulate" the Code to file for relief under Chapter 13 simply to 
discharge a debt that would be nondischargeable in Chapter 
7.156 
Notwithstanding its overly judgmental overtones, Melton 
provides a rational response to the suggestion, raised by some 
courts, that forcing a debtor to sacrifice expenditures that bene-
fit non-legal dependents is cruel.157 While the Melton court's 
analysis is colored by its disapproval of the debtor's non-
traditional lifestyle, the opinion nevertheless is useful because it 
is one of the few that explicitly notes the distinction between a 
"legal" obligation to provide support to legal dependents (which 
should be allowed in bankruptcy) and a "moral" desire to help 
non-legal dependents (which should not). Moreover, by refusing 
to base its holding on whether a lifestyle choice is noble or 
moral, the Melton court avoided the paradoxical conclusion that 
an economically unnecessary lifestyle choice suddenly can be-
come necessary if it is not too excessive or extravagant. 
Applying the Melton court's distinction between legal and 
moral obligations would have changed the nonsensical result in 
Arnold v. Weast (In re Arnold).158 The debtor in Arnold claimed 
exemptions for his new spouse's dependent children under a 
state exemption statute that permitted heads of household to 
claim a $250 exemption for each unmarried dependent child 
under. the age of eighteen.159 ·The court allowed the debtor to 
tutes a family 'til Gabriel blows his horn,' and the 165 acres he lives on is sheltered by 
the Texas family homestead exemption"); Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 
1128, 1131, 1133 (4th Cir. 1995) (ruling that a debtor's individual retirement accounts, 
worth almost one and one-half million dollars, fell within the terms of a specific state 
exemption). 
156. For example, the debtor in In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128, 1131 (4th Cir. 1995), 
had over a million dollars in individual retirement accounts (IRAs). He claimed the re-
tirement funds were not "disposable income" because the funds were exempt under Ma-
ryland state law. Likewise, he argued, and the court agreed, that forcing him to with-
draw these funds to repay his debts "could have devastating results for pension and 
retirement savings." Id. at 1133. The debtor paid virtually all other creditors in full 
before filing. The only creditors were former patients (and the spouse of one) of the 
debtor who sued him for sexual misconduct allegedly occurring during treatment. Id. at 
1130. Thus, little doubt existed that the debtor filed for protection under Chapter 13 
solely to discharge debts not dischargeable in Chapter 7. Although it noted that a "dis-
tasteful situation" was created, the Fourth Circttit nonetheless excluded the IRA income 
from disposable income even though doing so would cause the tort victims to receive 
only $45,000 of their claimed damages of $160 million. Id. at 1133-34. 
157. The court in In re Riegodedios observed that "'[a]ll disposable income' does not 
mean debtor's prison in a modern sense." 146 B.R. 691, 693 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992). 
158. 193 B.R. 897 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996). 
159. Id. at 901. See Mo. STAT. ANN. § 513.440 (West Supp. 1996). 
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claim a $250 exemption for his wife's three dependent children 
because the children's actual father refused to support them. 
While the court conceded that the children's biological father 
was legally responsible for them, the court allowed the debtor to 
treat these non-dependents as· dependents because he chose to 
support them when their actual father refused to do so.160 
To be consistent, the court then refused to allow the debtor 
to claim an exemption for one of his own children because he 
was in arrears on his child support payments and, thus, had not 
fulfilled his "legal responsibility" toward that child.161 This opin-
ion turns the notion of legal responsibility on its head by treat-
ing a non-legal dependent as a legal dependent and treating a 
legal dependent as a non-legal dependent. Applying Melton's le-
gal v. moral distinction would reintroduce common sense into 
the determination of who constitutes a legal dependent by deny-
ing the exemption for the new wife's kids (not legal dependents) 
and allowing it for the debtor's own child (a legal dependent). 
The simplest and perhaps most effective way to prevent 
debtors from attempting to provide support to non-legal depen-
dents is to amend the Code to clarify that "dependent" means 
only legal dependents. Therefore, Congress should amend both 
sections 101, 522, and 1325 of the Code to define dependent as 
only those persons that the debtor is legally required to support. 
To encompass various states' requirements concerning an indi-
vidual's obligation to provide economic support to ·third-par-
ties, 162 the Code should permit debtors to rely on either state or 
federal laws to establish the identities of their legal dependents. 
4. Lifestyle Choices That Allow Debtors to Discharge Non-
Support Marital Debts. The problems caused by the courts' fail-
ure to articulate a normative standard to evaluate lifestyle 
choices have been exacerbated by a recent amendment to the 
Code. In the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,163 Congress 
amended the Code to clarify164 that debtors can discharge cer-
160. In re Arnold, 193 B.R. at 901. 
161. Id. at 902. 
162. See supra note 72. 
163. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codi-
fied and amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 18 U.S. C., and 28 U.S. C.). 
164. Before this amendment, it was not clear whether debtors had the right to dis-
charge non-support obligations. See Drennan v. Drennan (In Re Drennan), 161 B.R. 661, 
667 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993) (holding that an agreement that wife receive one half of 
debtor's retirement benefits was not dischargeable); Bush v. Taylor, 912 F.2d 989, 995-96 
(8th Cir. 1990) (holding that property settlement was not dischargeable); Troup v. Troup, 
730 F.2d 464, 466 (6th Cir. 1984) ("hold harmless" clauses may create nondischargeable 
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tain divorce-related obligations under limited circumstances. 
While a debtor can never discharge alimony and child support 
debts, 165 debtors may discharge obligations to hold an ex-spouse 
harmless on joint debts and may discharge obligations imposed 
pursuant to a property settlement under section 523(a)(15).166 To 
discharge these debts ("section (a)(15) debts"), the debtor must 
show either that (1) she cannot repay the debt or (2) that the 
harm (to the debtor) caused by repaying the debt is greater than 
the harm (to the non-debtor spouse) caused by the debt not be-
ing paid.167 
When deciding if the debtor has enough money to repay a 
section (a)(15) debt, or whether the debtor or her ex-spouse will 
be most harmed if the debt is discharged, courts inevitably must 
evaluate the lifestyles of. both the debtor and the ex-spouse and 
then decide how much the debtor must sacrifice before she is al-
lowed to discharge an otherwise nondischargeable debt.168 Since 
courts have yet to develop a normative standard to judge life-
style choices in other settings, it is not surprising that judicial 
interpretations of section 523(a)(15) have been inconsistent, be-
wildering, and sometimes downright disconcerting.169 The awk-
obligations); Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir. 1983) (hold 
harmless' clauses may create nondischargeable obligation). 
165. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) & § 1328(a)(2) (1994). 
166. 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX15) (1994) is effective in Chapter 7 cases filed on or after Oc-
tober 22, 1994. Debtors who file for relief under Chapter 13 have an absolute right to 
discharge section 523(a)(15) divorce obligations. 
167. Section 523(a)(15) provides that a non-support debt is dischargeable unless 
(A) the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt from income or prop-
erty of the debtor not reasonably necessary to be expended for the maintenance 
or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor ... or 
(B) discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the debtor that out-
weighs the detrimental consequences to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the 
debtor[.] 
11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(15){A) & (B). 
168. See Phillips v. Phillips (In re Phillips), 187 B.R. 363, 369 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1995). The court commented that "[t]he legislative history of this section essentially re-
quires this Court to make a value judgment in deciding which party suffers the most." 
I d. 
169. See discussion infra notes 174-181. One court observed that section 523(a)(15) 
forces federal bankruptcy courts "to revisit, in excruciating detail, the anger, the bitter-
ness, and the pain" that the debtor and ex-spouse feel as a result of a divorce. Silvers v. 
Silvers (In re Silvers), 187 B.R. 648 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995). See also Kessler v. Butler 
(In re Butler), 186 B.R. 371, 372 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995) (stating that using section 
523(a)(15) is the "equivalent to applying acupuncture without a license" because it failed 
to heal the emotional wounds existing from a divorce). 
Forcing bankruptcy courts to reevaluate issues raised, and presumably resolved, in a 
prior divorce proceeding essentially converts bankruptcy courts into federal "family" 
courts. Addressing the federalism concerns raised by this use of the bankruptcy courts 
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ward, somewhat impenetrable language Congress used in sec-
tion 523(a)(15) is responsible for some of the inconsistent 
interpretations.170 However, the primary reason courts seem un-
able to decide how much debtors must sacrifice before they can 
discharge section 523(a)(15) debts is due to their general failure 
to develop any consistent, predictable standards concerning 
lifestyle issues.1n 
Courts asked to discharge section (a)(15) debts generally 
have relied on the analysis used in other "lifestyle" cases. Specif-
ically, when deciding whether it would be an "undue hardship" 
for the debtor to repay the debt, courts have relied on the fac-
tors cited in student loan undue hardship cases.172 Likewise, 
when deciding how to balance the harm to the debtor and her 
ex-spouse if the debt is discharged, courts rely on the "reasona-
bly necessary'' test when examining a Chapter 13 debtor's 
budget.173 Because courts have not narrowly defined "necessary" 
is, however, beyond the scope of this Article. 
170. One cpurt commented that the clumsy statute amounted to nothing more than 
"disgraceful draftsmanship." Samayoa v. Jodoin (In re Jodoin), 196 B.R. 845, 853 (Bankr. 
E.D. Cal. 1996). Another court declared that the "use of triple negatives" in the statute 
"turned an otherwise well intended statute into sausage." In re Butler, 186 B.R. 371, 373 
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1995). 
171. Cf., Pollak, supra note 6, at 554 ("The lack of coherence regarding the stan-
dards of disposable income and reasonably necessary in Chapter 13 tithing cases are 
paralleled by treatment of substantial abuse challenges and tithing in Chapter 7."). 
172. See Wolfe v. McCartin (In re McCartin), 204 B.R. 647 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996); 
Greenwalt v. Greenwalt (In re Greenwalt), 200 B.R. 909, 913 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1996); 
Henderson v. Henderson (In re Henderson), 200 B.R. 322 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996); Stone 
v. Stone (In re Stone), 199 B.R. 753 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996); Willey v. Willey (In re Wil-
ley), 198 B.R. 1007 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996); Samayoa v. Jodoin (In re Jodoin), 196 B.R. 
845 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1996); M~Ginnis v. McGinnis (In re McGinnis), 194 B.R. 917 
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996); Humiston v. Huddelston (In re Huddelston), 194 B.R. 681 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996); In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996); Straub v. 
Straub (In re Straub), 192 B.R. 522 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1996); Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 
191 B.R. 760 (Bankr. N.D. ill. 1996); Anthony v. Anthony (In re Anthony), 190 B.R. 433 
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 19~5); Florio v. Florio (In re Florio), 187 B.R. 654 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 
1995); Comisky v. Comisky (In re Comisky), 183 B.R. 883 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995); but 
see Bodily v. Morris (In re Morris), 193 B.R. 949, 953 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) ("This 
Court declines to apply any aspect of the student loan test, finding that to do so merely 
confuses the analysis the Court is required to make."). 
173. Because the ability to pay language in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(A) mirrors the 
language used in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2), courts have applied the same standard. See 
Ginter v. Crosswhite (In re Crosswhite), No. 95-1021, 1996 WL 756745, at *1 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ind. July 3, 1996); Sterna v. Paneras (In re Paneras), 195 B.R. 395, 404 (Bankr. 
N.D. ill. 1996); McGinnis v. McGinnis (In re McGinnis), 194 B.R. 917, 920 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ala. 1996); Bodily v. Morris (In re Morris), 193 B.R. 949, 952 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1995); 
Humiston v. Huddelston (In re Huddelston), 194 B.R. 681, 686 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996); 
Dressler v. Dressler (In re Dressler), 194 B.R. 290, 304 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1996); In re 
Smither, 194 B.R. 102, 109 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996); Slover v. Slover (In re Slover), 191 
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and have yet to develop an analytical framework to decide how 
much a debtor should sacrifice before repaying a loan becomes 
an undue hardship, they have reached widely and wildly incon-
sistent results when interpreting section 523(a)(15). Particularly 
disturbing are opinions that discharge section (a)(15) debts be-
cause of value-laden conclusions about the debtor's ex-spouse's 
lifestyle. 
Some courts have discharged section (a)(15) debts after con-
cluding that the creditor/ex-spouse would not be harmed eco-
nomically because that spouse is either too rich or too poor. The 
debtor in In re Taylor174 was gainfully employed, had no depen-
dents, and had over $3,000 in monthly disposable income.175 Al-
though the debtor clearly could repay the section (a)(15) debt 
without sacrificing any economically necessary items, the court 
discharged the debt because it concluded that the ex-spouse was 
rich and, thus, could afford not to have the debt repaid.176 In 
contrast, the court In re Morris177 concluded that discharging the 
debt would cause no real economic harm to the ex-spouse be-
cause the ex-spouse would still have "negative excess disposable 
income" even if the debt was repaid.178 In other words, because 
the creditor/ex-spouse would still be poor even if the debtor re-
paid the debt, the court reasoned that discharging the debt 
would not economically harm her. To help alleviate the financial 
predicament then facing the poor ex-spouse, the Morris court, in 
terms that almost so-q.nded advisory, posited that "where the 
nondebtor spouse is hopelessly in debt, the best solution is for 
both spouses to file bankruptcy."179 
Unfortunately, the Morris court is not the only one that has 
advised non-debtor ex-spouses to file for bankruptcy if they are 
harmed by the court's decision to discharge the section (a)(15) 
debt.180 Giving such advice creates the rather disturbing specter 
B.R. 886, 892 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1996); Hesson v. Hesson (In re Hesson), 190 B.R. 229, 
237 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995); Collins v. Florez (In re Florez), 191 B.R. 112, 115 (Bankr. N.D. 
ill. 1995); In re Phillips, 187 B.R. 363, 368 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995); In re Carroll, 187 
B.R. 197, 200 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995); Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750, 754-55 
(Bankr. N.D. ill. 1995). 
174. 191 B.R. 760 (Bankr. N.D. ill. 1996). 
175. Id. at 762-63. 
176. The court referred to the ex-spouse as "a very solvent and relatively well to do 
individual." Id. at 763. 
177. 193 B.R. 949 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996). 
178. Id. at 954-55. 
179. Id. at 954. 
180. See, e.g., Willey v. Willey (In re Willey), 198 B.R. 1007, 1017 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1996); Craig v. Craig (In re Craig), 196 B.R. 305, 309 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996); Hesson v. 
Hesson (In re Hesson), 190 B.R. 229, 241 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995); Silvers v. Silvers (In re 
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of bankruptcy judges generating business for themselves by trig-
gering domino fllings.181 Moreover, it is virtually impossible to 
determine which (if any) bankruptcy or social policy courts in-
terpreting section 523(a)(15) are trying to advance when they al-
low a debtor to avoid repaying a debt simply because the credi-
tor is too rich or too poor. There is no apparent policy 
justification for penalizing a non-debtor ex-spouse simply be-
cause he became successful after the divorce, or for penalizing 
an ex-spouse because he has not recovered from a financially 
devastating divorce.182 Thus, it is unclear why courts would use 
the success of an ex-spouse to discharge a debt if the debtor can 
repay the debt without sacrificing any economically necessary 
Silvers), 187 B.R. 648 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995); Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750, 756 
(Bankr. N.D. ill. 1995); BUT SEE Christison v. Christison (In re Christison), 201 B.R. 298, 
311 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (finding that courts who urge creditor spouses to flle for 
bankruptcy "cavalierly ignore questions of whether the creditor spouse is eligible to file a 
bankruptcy case" a reasoning that "[t]he fact that the non-filing creditor spouse may 
later file bankruptcy is not a relevant factor in weighing the relative impact to the re-
spective parties"). 
Although acknowledging that forcing the ex-spouse to file for bankruptcy is unfair, 
the court in Hesson v. Hesson (In re Hesson), 190 B.R. 229, 241 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995), 
stated that "no one should assume that life is fair." As section 105 gives bankruptcy 
courts broad equitable powers, this is an odd comment indeed. See generally Hinkle v. 
Wheaton College (In re Hinkle), 200 B.R. 690, 693 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1996) (recognizing 
that "[a] number of courts have used [their equitable powers] to restructure • • • loans, 
either by finding them to be only partially nondischargeable1 deferring enforcement, or 
fashioning payment schedules"). 
181. After noting that the likely effect of discharging the support debt would be 
forcing the ex-spouse to file Chapter 7, one bankruptcy court made the following obser-
vation: "That is indeed a detrimental consequence, but then again, is it so bad?" Hill v. 
Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750, 756 (Bankr. N.D. ill. 1995). Whether it is "bad" depends 
on who you are. From the court's perspective, the result is neither bad nor good since 
the court's credit history is not at risk and the only potential harm to the court is an in-
creased docket. If the section (a)(15) debt is a joint marital credit card debt, discharging 
the debt from the debtor's perspective is not so bad: it's great. Assuming the ex-spouse 
has no moral or philosophical objections to filing for bankruptcy (some people do, see 
Christison v. Christison (In re Christison), 201 B.R. 298, 311 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) 
(noting that "many individuals today continue to consider bankruptcy an antithetical so-
lution to oppressive debt")), it may not be so bad. However, for the hapless credit card 
issuer who will not receive money from either the debtor or the soon-to-be-debtor, it is 
not just bad: it's awful. See also Remarks at the Meeting of the National Bankruptcy Re-
view Commission (Oct. 19, 1996) (minutes on file with author). One marriage and family 
therapist noted that bankruptcy has a "psycho-biolegal" effect on some people. Id. 
182. Bankruptcy courts frequently note that people encounter extreme fmancial dif-
ficulties after a divorce and that one of the primary causes for consumer filings is a re-
cent divorce. See Christison v. Christison (In re Christison), 201 B.R. 298, 301 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 1996); Silvers v. Silvers (In re Silvers), 187 B.R. 648 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995); 
see also Peter C. Alexander, Divorce and the Dischargeability of Debts: Focusing on lVo· 
men as Creditors in Bankruptcy, 43 CATH. U. L. REv. 351 (1994). 
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lifestyle expenditures. Nor is it clear why courts would use the 
economic failure of a non-debtor ex-spouse to support its deci-
sion to discharge the section (a)(15) debt. 
Given the unartful language Congress used in section 
(a)(15),183 it is unlikely that courts ever will reach consistent re-
sults in interpreting this provision. Because courts interpreting 
this section have relied heavily on student loan discharge cases, 
and because the intent of the statute seems to be to discharge 
the marital debts when forcing debtors to repay the debts would 
be unduly burdensome, I propose amending section (a)(15) to 
provide that non-support debts presumptively are dischargeable 
unless excepting such debt from discharge will impose an undue 
hardship on the debtor and the debtor's legal dependents. 
Adopting this revision will prevent debtors from being forced to 
repay debts when doing so would deprive them of economic ne-
cessities, but would force them to repay the debt even if their 
ex-spouse could afford not to have the debt repaid. 
Applying this proposed language probably would change the 
outcome in Morris because the court's holding was based, in 
part, on the court's concern that forcing the debtor to pay the 
section (a)(15) debt "nickeled and dimed" the debtor and jeop-
ardized his relationship with his children.184 Applying this pro-
posed language clearly would change the result in Taylor. Since 
the debtor in Taylor could repay the debt without sacrificing any 
economically necessary items, the successful ex-spouse would be 
repaid and thus be treated no differently than other creditors 
who can afford not to be repaid (like hospitals, banks, or credit 
card issuers). Applying the revised section (a)(15) to someone 
like the Taylor debtor would at most force the debtor to (1) sus-
pend payments to his tax-sheltered retirement plan, (2) lease a 
cheaper apartment, or (3) lease a less expensive car.185 
183. One court described the statute as "a paving stone on the road to the region of 
Hades reserved for litigation nightmares." In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102, 106 (Bankr. W.D. 
Ky. 1996). . 
184. Bodily v. Morris (In re Morris), 193 B.R. 949, 954 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1995). 
185. See Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 191 B.R. 760, 767 (Bankr. N.D.ill. 1996). Be-
ing prevented from accumulating retirement benefits or being forced to move to a 
cheaper apartment can hardly be considered an undue hardship when one considers that· 
the average savings rate for Americans is 6.4%, and Americans are not guaranteed any-
place to live, much less a large and expensive apartment. See The Economy: Why Cut 
Capital Gains Tax Rate? Our Level is Higher Than Most, INvESTORS Bus. DAILY, Jan. 27, 
1997, at B1. Estimates of the number of homeless people in America vary between a low 
of 192,000 to 300,000 to a high of 1.5 to 3 million. See John J. Dilullo, Jr., There But For 
Fortune-The Homeless: Who Are They and How to Help Them, NEW REPUBLIC, June, 
1991, at 28. 
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Amending the Code to discharge section (a)(15) debts only 
upon a showing of undue hardship would prevent courts from 
engaging in the current practice of forcing debtors to repay sec-
tion (a)(15) debts only if the non-debtor ex-spouse is poorer than 
the debtor, but not so poor as to be a candidate for bankruptcy 
relief. Instead, courts would require debtors to sacrifice all eco-
nomically non-essential lifestyle expenditures and would dis-
charge the section (a)(15) debt only if the debtor cannot both re-
pay the debt and provide economically necessary support for her 
and her legal dependents.186 
5. Lifestyle Choices That Allow Debtors to Make Charitable 
Contributions Rather Than Repay Their Debts. Even when peo-
ple are contemplating bankruptcy and not paying their bills, or 
have filed for bankruptcy and do not intend to repay all their 
debts, they frequently give money to their religious organiza-
tions. Specifically, some Chapter 7 debtors have attempted to 
use their future earnings to tithe, rather than to fund a Chapter 
13 plan.187 When this has occurred, courts have questioned 
whether the debtor is acting in good faith or is attempting to 
abuse bankruptcy laws.188 In addition, Chapter 7 and 13 Trust-
ees have brought fraudulent conveyance actions189 to recover 
money debtors gave to their churches before they filed for bank-
ruptcy relief.190 Also, debtors have sought to discharge otherwise 
186. At least one court modified a section (a)(15) debt and required the debtor to 
pay only a portion of the debt. Comisky v. Comisky (In re Comisky), 183 B.R. 883 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995). While the Code does not authorize courts to modify debts, such 
an approach would be consistent with the argument advanced in this Article as long as 
courts discharge only that portion of the section (a)(15) debt that, if repaid, would re-
quire debtors to suffer an "undue" hardship. 
187. See In re Hudson, 56 B.R. 415 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985), modified in part, 64 
B.R. 73 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (dismissing Chapter 7 petition because the debtor con-
tributed funds to non-profit institutions rather than funding a Chapter 13 plan). 
188. See, e.g., Iyy v. Myers (In re lyy), 920 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Curry, 77 
B.R. 969 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re Breckenridge, 12 B.R. 159 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
1980). 
189. Fraudulent conveyance actions are designed to prevent debtors from diminish-
ing the amount of property available to repay creditors during bankruptcy. A Chapter 7 
or Chapter 13 Trustee can avoid a transfer as a fraudulent conveyance by proving that, 
within a year before filing for bankruptcy, an insolvent debtor transferred an interest in 
property to a third-party and received less than "reasonably equivalent value" for the 
transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1994). A debtor facing a fraudulent transfer action is 
deemed to have been insolvent if, at the time of the transfer, the sum of the debtor's 
debts exceeded the debtor's property. 11 U.S.C § 101(32)(A) (1994). 
190. See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407 
(8th Cir. 1996); Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman 1), 183 B.R. 239 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1995). 
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nondischargeable debts so they can use that money to tithe.191 
The conflict between a debtor's desire to tithe rather than 
repay debts most frequently arises, however, when a Chapter 13 
debtor maintains that she is required only to use disposable in-
come minus 10% to fund her Chapter 13 plan. In these cases, 
debtors argue that tithing is reasonably necessary for their sup-
port and, accordingly, should be included as a line item in their 
proposed budgets. Courts typically confirm plans that contain 
tithing as a necessary expense as long as the tithe is not exces-
sive.192 Generally, a tithe will be considered excessive only if the 
debtor proposes to give a disproportionate amount of her dispos-
able income to the religious organization rather than credi-
tors.193 By framing the argument based on the amount of the 
contribution, courts again fail to ask whether the choice itself 
(contributing any money to a non-creditor organization) is eco-
nomically necessary and yields tangible, economic benefits to 
the debtor. 
Courts who have addressed tithing generally discount (or ig-
nore) bankruptcy policy. Instead they focus on whether prevent-
191. Some courts have refused to discharge student loans because of their concern 
that the integrity of bankruptcy laws would be diminished if they yielded to that choice. 
See, e.g., Lynn v. Diversified Collection Serv. & USA Funds, Inc. (In re Lynn), 168 B.R. 
693, 697 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994); Motor v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re Mo-
tor), 64 B.R. 317, 318 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986). 
The court in In re Sturgeon, 51 B.R. 82 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1985), refused to allow a 
Chapter 13 debtor to tithe rather than repay a debt relating to a drunk driving judg-
ment (when this case was decided, drunk driving judgments were dischargeable in 
Chapter 13). The court concluded that, while it was a "noble thought and gesture on her 
part" to give 10% of the "fruits of her labor" to her church, it would be a "more just and 
noble a gesture" to offer the money to the estate of the DUI victim. Id. at 83. 
192. Creditors typically have not argued (and courts have not found) that tithing 
transformed an otherwise modest budget into ·an excessive or extravagant one. See In re 
Tessier, 190 B.R. 396 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995) (while unsecured creditors received noth-
ing, there was no suggestion that the budget included extravagant expenditures); In re 
Lees, 192 B.R. 756, 760 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1994) (budget with proposed tithe listed noth-
ing for recreation or any other discretionary item). Moreover, most Chapter 13 debtors 
had tithed for a number of years before filing and stated that they would continue to 
tithe even if it meant taking another job. See id. at 758 (debtor tithed for 30 years); In 
re McDaniel I, 126 B.R. 782, 783 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) (debtor tithed for "several" 
years); In re Packham, 126 B.R. 603, 605 (Bankr. D. Utah 1991) (debtors tithed since 
they first started earning income); In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348, 357 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1988) (debtor testified tithing was a long-standing family practice). 
193. See, e.g., In re McDaniel I, 126 B.R. 782 (determining $540 monthly tithe exces-
sive whl!re creditors receive only $600); In re Breckenridge, 12 B.R. at 159-60 (allowing 
tithe would reduce creditors repayment from 70% to 10%); In re Curry, 77 B.R. 969 (pro-
posing to give more than 50% of disposable income deemed excessive); but see In re 
Gaukler, 63 B.R. 224, 225-26 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986) (finding debtor's tithe of over one-
third of monthly income was excessive, b~t not considered substantial abuse). 
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ing the debtor from tithing violates the First Amendmentl94 or, 
more recently, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
("RFRA").195 Missing from both the judicial and scholarly treat-
ment of the issue is an in-depth consideration of the following 
question: assuming tithing is not constitutionally protected, 196 
194. See In re Lees, 192 B.R. at 758-59; In re Newman I, 183 B.R. 239; In re Cava-
naugh, 175 B.R. at 374; In re Faulkner, 165 B.R. 644 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); In re Lee, 
162 B.R. 31 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993); In re McDaniel I, 126 B.R. at 784; In re Green, 103 
B.R. 852 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988); In re Miles, 96 B.R. 348 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989); In 
re Bien, 95 B.R. 281 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989); In re Reynolds, 83 B.R. 684 (Bankr. \V.D. 
Mo. 1988); In re Navarro, 83 B.R. at 353; In re Curry, 77 B.R. 969; In re Green, 73 B.R. 
893 (Bankr. W.D. Mich 1987); Ellenberg v. Chapel Hill Harvester Church, Inc. (In re 
Moses), 59 B.R. 815 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986). 
195. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 5 U.S.C.). See In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407, 
1418-19 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding fraudulent conveyance actions to recover tithes violate 
RFRA because governmental action significantly constrained the debtors' ability to ex-
press a central tenet of their religious beliefs, curtailed the debtors' ability to express ad-
herence to their faith, and denied the debtors a reasonable opportunity to engage in tith-
ing, a concept fundamental to their religion). See also, Morris v. Midway S. Baptist 
Church (In re Newman ll), 203 B.R. 468, 475-77 (D. Kan. 1995); Fitzgerald v. Magic Val-
ley Evangelical Free Church (In re Hodge), 200 B.R. 884, 894-901 (D. Idaho 1996); In re 
Tessier, 190 B.R. 396 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995); In re Faulkner, 165 B.R. 644, 648 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 1994). In City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997), the United States Su-
preme Court held that Congress exceeded its remedial powers when it enacted RFRA. 
Because RFRA is unconstitutional, bankruptcy courts must now rely on the First 
Amendment to protect a debtor's right to tithe. 
196. It is beyond the scope of this Article to address whether tithing is a constitu-
tionally protected activity. Many commentators have undertaken this task already. See, 
generally, Oliver B. Pollack, Religious Tithing, Fraudulent Transfers in Bankruptcy, and 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 6 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 209 (1997); Pollack, supra 
note 6; Brian Wildermuth, Note, In re Lee: Tithing As Grounds for Dismissal Under Sec-
tion 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 725 (1995); Michael M. Duclos, A 
Debtor's Right to Tithe in Bankruptcy Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 11 
BANKR. DEV. J. 665 (1995); Long, supra note 89; Donald R. Price & Mark C. Rahdert, 
Distributing the First Fruits: Statutory and Constitutional Implications of Tithing in 
Bankruptcy, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 853 (1993); Cerne, supra note 5; Bruce Edward Kosub 
& Susan K Thompson, Note, The Religious Debtor's Conviction to Tithe as the Price of a 
Chapter 13 Discharge, 66 TEx. L. REv. 873 (1988); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA 
Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and The U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REv. 249 (1995); 
David W. Case, Comment, Resolving the Conflict between Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy 
Code and the Free Exercise Clause-In re Green: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 57 MISS. 
L.J. 163, 16S (1987). 
If the bankruptcy court concludes that tithing is a constitutionally protected lifestyle 
choice, and that the government does not have a compelling interest in either the effi-
cient and orderly administration of the bankruptcy system or protecting the legitimate 
interests of creditors, the court would not need to consider whether tithing is a neces-
sary lifestyle choice. If, instead, the court concludes that tithing either is not a protected 
activity or that the government has a compelling interest in having an efficient, orderly, 
and fair federal debt collection system, courts then should ask whether tithing yields an 
economically necessary, tangible benefit to the debtor. 
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should this lifestyle choice be allowed in bankruptcy? Because 
courts and scholars largely have ignored this crucial policy con-
sideration, their analyses of the issues have been influenced by 
whether they think the act of giving money to a church is good 
(not whether the act is consistent with bankruptcy policy) or 
whether the debtor gave the church too much money (not 
whether the debtor should be allowed to give any amount). 
The lifestyle choice to tithe economically harms creditors 
but does not provide tangible, economic benefits to the debtor.197 
Since this choice economically harms creditors but does not give 
debtors tangible, necessary, economic198 benefits, the choice 
should be denied even if the court thinks it is noble. In contrast, 
if giving money to a church .yields a tangible economic benefit 
because, for example, it is a necessary business expense, 199 then 
the debtor should be allowed to make the contribution even if 
the court disapproves of it. Finally, as is true with all discretion-
ary expenditures, debtors should be allowed to give money to a 
church or any other non-creditor organization if they are willing 
to sacrifice "necessary'' items by, for example, restricting the 
amount or quality of food or clothing purchases.200 
197. I recognize that some devoutly religious debtors believe tithing is required by 
their faith and that adhering to their faith gives them the benefit of eternal life. See 
Mark 16:16; Romans 13:2; 1 Timothy 5:12.· While I neither dispute nor denigrate the 
sincerity of such beliefs, the Bankruptcy Code regulates only a debtor's physical, earthly 
needs. It is not designed, nor does it have the authority or ability, to regulate the 
debtor's psyche or his life in the hereafter. 
198. Again, I recognize that in the Christian faith, many believers feel that exercis-
ing their religious faith sustains them just as much as food, shelter, clothing, or medical 
care does. See John 6:27, 53-58; Revelations 2:7, 21:6. Just as this Article distinguishes 
between necessary and non-necessary expenses, life's necessities are secularly· defined. 
"Food" means edible goods that are physically consumed in the body, not the "bread of 
life", "bread of the mighty," or other forms of "spiritual" nourishment. John 6:35; Psalm 
78:25. Shelter means a structure that protects the debtor from meteorological harm, not 
a spiritual "shelter from the storm." Isaiah 25:4. Clothing means those items that are 
worn physically to protect the body from the elements, not a "cloth of righteousness" or 
"salvation." Job 29:14; ll Chronicles 6:41. Finally, I limit the definition of necessary 
medical care to services rendered by a hum~ being who received medical training some-
where on this earth, while recognizing that·many devout Christians genuinely believe 
that their Lord is their "healer." Psalms 103:2-3, 107:19-21, 147:3. 
199. For example, if the debtor is a full-time clergy person whose employer requires 
all employees to tithe, the tithe should be included in the debtor's budget as a necessary 
work expense. The same analysis also would apply if, for example, a debtor could show 
that contributing to the_ United Way Campaign was a necessary business expense. 
200. See In re Stottlemyre, 146 B.R. 234, 237 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (stating that · 
Chapter 12 debtor can restrict personal expenses for food or clothing to support their de-
sire to give money to their church). 
674 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
6. Lifestyle Choices That Provide Financial Support to 
Post-Petition Legal Dependents. A debtor who marries or 
procreates during the term of a Chapter 13 plan should be per-
mitted to modify plan payments to account for any additional 
expenses caused by this lifestyle choice as long as she did not 
marry or give birth solely for the purpose of economically harm-
ing her creditors. Typically, a Chapter 13 debtor who encounters 
an adverse change in circumstances may petition the court to 
modify the terms of the plan by decreasing the amount, or ex-
tending the number of payments. 201 The Code does not list the 
factors courts should consider when deciding whether to modify 
or eliminate202 plan payments nor does it tell courts how much 
debtors must sacrifice before they are entitled to reduce plan 
payments.203 In general, courts deny plan modifications if (1) the 
debtor "chose" to engage in a lifestyle activity, (2) the lifestyle 
activity created the inability to make plan payments, and (3) the 
lifestyle activity is not a "noble" ·one.204 In short, if the debtor 
"caused" her inability to make plan payments, courts will not al-
low her to modify those payments.2os 
While the "you-caused-it" reasoning sounds reasonable in 
the abstract, applying it to choices involving marriage and pro-
creation can lead to disturbing and unanticipated results. For 
example, the debtor in In re Nelson206 sought to modify her 
Chapter 13 plan payments because she could no longer make 
201. See 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1) & (2) (1994). The Code also permits the trustee and 
creditors to ask the court to modify plan payments in order to increase the amount of 
payments or decrease the length of plan payments. 
202. Courts also may grant a "hardship" discharge before the debtor completes plan 
payments if the debtor's failure to complete such payments is due to circumstances be-
yond the debtor's control. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(1) (1994). If a debtor receives a "hard-
ship discharge", she is required to repay debts that are dischargeable in Chapter 13, but 
are non-dischargeable in Chapter 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(2) (1994). Thus, the "pen-
alty" for failure to complete plan payments is the loss of the Chapter 13 super-discharge. 
See discussion supra note 80. 
203. See, e.g., Harry L. Deffebach, Postconfirmation Modification of Chapter 13 
Plans: A Sheep in Wolfs Clothing, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 153, 153 (1992) ("[T]he various ap-
proaches to postconfirmation modification of chapter 13 bankruptcy plans are obscured 
in rhetoric, resulting in contradictory judicial approaches to postconfrrmation modifica-
tion of chapter 13 plans.") (notes omitted). 
204. See generally In re Cooper, 98 B.R. 294, 300 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1989) (stating 
any modified Chapter 13 plan must meet all Chapter 13 requirements). 
205. Compare In re Witkowski, 16 F.3d 739, 742-44 (7th Cir. 1994) (there is no re-
quirement that a debtor initially show a change in circumstances before seeking to mod-
ify plan payments) with In re Arnold, 869 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1989) (to avoid a court or-
dered increase in monthly bankruptcy payments, a debtor must evidence an 
unanticipated substantial increase in his expenses). 
206. 189 B.R. 748 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995). 
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full plan payments and pay the expenses related to her new, 
physically disabled, husband.207 No one disputed that the 
debtor's spouse was disabled and could not work or that the 
debtor's new expenses actually were for her spouse.208 The only 
dispute was whether she was entitled to modify her Chapter 13 
plan to account for the expenses created by her post-
confirmation decision to marry a disabled person. The court 
characterized the debtor's decision to marry a disabled person 
who did not contribute to the debtor's household income as "vol-
untary," noting that she was aware of her new spouse's disabil-
ity before she married him, and that she "must have known that 
the disability would limit his ability to contribute to their mari-
tal expenses."209 The court rejected the debtor's claim that these 
changed circumstances warranted a decrease in plan payments, 
finding that the "circumstances are of her own making."210 
This "you-caused-it" analysis would be appropriate if the 
court was considering whether the debtor could modify plan 
payments because she voluntarily purchased a· BMW Refusing 
to condone the BMW-purchasing debtor's lifestyle choice makes 
sense, since permitting that choice would give the debtor an eco-
nomically non-necessary benefit that harms her creditors. While 
modifying the plan to account for expenses the debtor incurred 
by marrying a disabled person does prevent debtors from repay-
ing debts, providing support for a disabled spouse generally does 
not divert money from creditors to the debtor. Moreover, cate-
gorically preventing debtors from supporting dependents ac-
quired post-petition ignores the primary reason Congress and 
courts allow debtors to support their dependents and fails to 
recognize that providing this type of support may in many cir-
cumstances be in the best interests of creditors. 
Congress recognized that, in some situations, debt repay-
ment must yield to a debtor's desire to protect her loved ones. In 
addition to allowing Chapter 13 debtors to support their legal 
dependents, the Code automatically stays lawsuits to collect co-
signed debts until the bankruptcy case is either closed, dis-
missed or converted and permits debtors to repay co-signed 
debts at a higher rate than other unsecured debts.211 Congress 
prevents creditors from suing co-signors to collect the debt, then 
207. See id. at 749-50. 
208. Id. Moreover, the debtor could have included the expenses that were reasona-
bly necessary to support her spouse in her original Chapter 13 plan. Id. 
209. Id. at 751. 
210. Id. 
211. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a) & 1322(b)(1) (1994). 
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permits debtors to discriminate in favor of creditors holding 
claims co-signed by debtors' spouses and loved ones to ensure 
that debtors focus on rehabitating themselves in bankruptcy 
rather than shielding their friends or family from creditor collec-
tion attempts.212 Just as debtors would feel compelled to repay 
co-signed debts outside the plan to protect their loved ones, they 
would feel compelled to pay for the necessary living expenses of 
their spouses-whether the marriage occurred pre- or post-
petition. 
While creditors reasonably could expect a debtor to continue 
making plan payments even if she is not allowed to subscribe to 
cable or People magazine, it is unlikely that a debtor will con-
tinue making plan payments if doing so prevents her from giv-
ing her husband life's basic necessities. If Chapter 13 debtors 
use their income to support their spouses rather than make 
plan payments, creditors' alternatives are to move to have the 
case either dismissed or converted to Chapter 7.213 Creditors al-
most always receive less in Chapter 7 than they do in Chapter 
13.214 Thus, even if the Nelson debtor created the adverse cir-
cumstance by marrying a disabled man, allowing her to modify 
the plan to account for her new spouse's expenses actually bene-
fits her creditors because the modification increases the likeli-
hood that she will continue to make plan payments. 
The rigid "you-caused-it" analysis also ignores the possibil-
ity that marrying a person who cannot work outside the home 
could provide a tangible economic benefit to the debtor and a 
long-term benefit to creditors. If the debtor has children and the 
disabled spouse can provide in-home child care, the debtor 
would not have to pay the expenses for an outside child care 
provider. In addition, having an in-home child care provider may 
allow a debtor/parent to take a more demanding (or a second) 
job. Categorically preventing plan modifications based on volun-
tary post-petition marital lifestyle choices ignores the possibility 
212. See Timex Fed. Credit Union v. Di Domizio (In re Di Domizio), 11 B.R. 357, 358 
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (observing that Code section 1301 was enacted to prevent credi-
tors from bringing indirect pressure on Chapter 13 debtors to nilike payments outside 
the plan by threatening to collect the debt from friends or relatives who co-signed the 
debt); In re Martin, 189 B.R. 619, 627 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (presuming that discrimi-
natory treatment allowed by Code section 1322 was necessary to ensure the debtor com-
pleted plan payments without facing overwhelming pressure to make additional pay-
ments outside of the plan). 
213. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(6) (1994) (court may dismiss a Chapter 13 case or con-
vert it to a Chapter 7 case if the debtor defaults under the plan). 
214. See supra note 130. 
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that the debtor can show that providing support for her hus-
band gives her a tangible economic benefit. 
Finally, given the potential breadth of the court's "you-
caused-it" analysis, courts applying this analysis could (1) pre-
vent a married female debtor from modifying a plan to account 
for pregnancy-related expenses if she became pregnant but 
chose not to abort the child, o~ (2) prevent a debtor from modify-
ing plan payments to include additional medical expenses cre-
ated by injuries the debtor sustained while voluntarily engaging 
in a known high risk activity like skydiving, skiing, or parasail-
ing. Since the decision to give birth or to participate in a risky 
activity is a "choice," courts could refuse to permit plan modifi-
cations in these instances-even though the medical expenses 
related to the choice are economically necessary-simply be-
cause the choice was the debtor's. 
Courts should not reduce plan payments if a debtor chooses 
to marry a person who will not work or chooses to bear multiple 
children during the pendency of a Chapter 13 plan.215 Where, 
however, a debtor's lifestyle choice creates economically neces-
sary expenses, or where denying the choice most likely will eco-
nomically harm creditors, courts should allow the choice even if 
the court is offended by the choice or thinks the debtor volunta-
rily made the choice. 
7. Lifestyle Choices Supported By State Exemption Stat-
utes. A Chapter 7 debtor gives the Trustee virtually all the prop-
erty she owns when she files her bankruptcy petition, except for 
a limited amount of property she can protect or "exempt" under 
section 522 of the Code. Debtors can exempt property under sec-
tion 522216 to ensure both that they keep a reasonable amount of 
economic assets to help them start over in life and that they 
215. How many kids is too many kids is a decision that courts necessarily must de-
cide on a case-by-case basis. If the debtor is pregnant when the plan is confirmed, it is 
at least biologically possible for her to seek modification more than once during the 
course of a three to five year plan. If the court concludes that the debtor is "choosing" to 
have additional children rather than repaying her debts, then it would be appropriate to 
deny further modifications-not because she chose to become pregnant, but because she 
became pregnant solely to avoid repaying her debts. 
216. See H.R REP. No. 95-595, at 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.AN. 5963, 
6087. Although section 522 applies to both Chapter 7 and 13 filings, most exemption 
cases involve Chapter 7 debtors. Chapter 13 debtors generally have no need to exempt 
property from creditors because they typically keep all their pre-petition property, both 
exempt and non-exempt, and fund the plan using their post-petition disposable income, 
not their pre-petition property. See In re Cordes, 147 B.R. 498, 504 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
1992). 
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keep some sentimental assets.217 Allowing debtors to exempt 
property under state exemption statutes that place no monetary 
limitations on the value of exemptible property218 represents 
perhaps the most striking conflict between the need to allow 
debtors to keep economically necessary items and the need to 
prevent them from keeping economically non-necessary items. 
Creditors criticize the exemption procedure provided in Sec-
tion 522 for two primary reasons. First, because debtors can ex-
empt property based either on state statutes or the Code, 219 
creditors and commentators argue that the exemption scheme 
creates non-uniformity and creditor uncertainty and prevents 
creditors from knowing (both when credit is extended and when 
the debtor files for bankruptcy) exactly what (and how much) 
property a debtor will claim as exempt.220 Second, and more im-
portant, creditors criticize exemptions because they let some 
debtors manipulate generous state exemption laws to shield vir-
tually all their assets from creditors. This, critics contend, gives 
debtors a "head" start-not just a fresh start.221 
In addition to having the right to exempt extravagant real 
property, debtors have the right to convert nonexempt assets 
(like cash) into exempt property (like a home) solely to take ad-
217. See, e.g., VA. CODE .ANN. §§ 34-26(1) (family bible), 34-26(1a) (wedding and en-
gagement rings), 34-26(2) (family portraits and heirlooms valued at less than $5000), & 
34-26(5) (family pets not kept or raised for sale or profit); FLA. STAT . .ANN.§ 222.18 (West 
1989) (disability benefits); MAss. GEN LAws. CH. 235 § 34 (West 1986) (2 cows, 12 sheep, 
two swine and 4 tons of hay, as well as tools used to carry on debtor's trade); Omo REv. 
CODE .ANN. § 239.66 (Baldwin 1994) (debtor's interest in a burial lot and professionally 
prescribed or medically necessary health aids). 
218. Border v. McDaniel (In re McDaniel II), 730 F.3d 841 (5th Cir. 1995) (debtor 
claimed 165 acre property as exempt); Davis v. Davis (In re Davis), 170 B.R. 892, 893 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994) (debtor claimed $500,000 house as exempt). See TEx. PRoP. CoDE 
.ANN. § 41.002 (West Supp. 1997) (unlimited homestead exemption); FLA. STAT . .ANN. 
§ 222.01 (West Supp. 1997) (unlimited homestead exemption). 
219. A debtor may claim property as exempt by relying on either section 522(d) of 
the Code or her state's exemption laws, unless the debtor's state of residence has "opted 
out" of the federal exemptions and requires debtors to rely on state law. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 522(b)(1)-(b)(2)(B) (1994). 
220. See Steven L. Harris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg's Bankruptcy Law in Per-
spective, 30 UCLA L. REv. 327, 339 (1982) Oetting debtor's exemption vary by state in-
creases creditors' uncertainty and costs). 
221. See William T. Vukowich, Reforming the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: An Al-
ternative Approach, 71 GEO. L.J. 1129, 1152 (1983) ("To overcome the ml\ior criticisms of 
the new Bankruptcy Act, one simple and relatively minor change is needed. The exemp-
tion policy should be modified • • . ."); Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspec-
tive, 28 UCLA L. REv. 953, 994 (1981) (arguing that exemption planning allows debtors 
to keep more property than they need for survival and a fresh start). 
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vantage of generous exemption statutes.222 That debtors engage 
in such pre-filing exemption planning is no secret.223 Most do so 
openly, on the advice of counsel.224 The Code places no limits on 
the amount of non-exempt property a debtor can convert to ex-
empt property. 
While Congress is aware that pre-filing exemption planning 
occurs, it has been unwilling to limit either a debtor's right to 
rely on generous state law exemptions or her right to convert 
nonexempt property into exempt property to shield it during the 
bankruptcy proceeding.225 Instead, Congress has made the policy 
determination that States should be allowed to determine the 
minimal living needs of their residents. Since Congress prevents 
courts from applying a good faith test to examine pre-filing con-
versions of property, 226 as long as a debtor can prove that he did 
not fraudulently convert the property, courts should permit him 
to exempt converted property even if it is non-necessary.227 Thus, 
222. See generally Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Con· 
vert Their Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Vu:tims of the Fresh Start? 70 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 235 (1995); Douglas E. Deutsch, Note, Exemption Reform: Examining the 
Proposals, 3 &1. BANKR. lNST. L. REv. 207 (1995); J.T. Hardin, Bankruptcy Planning: 
Risks of Converting Nonexempt Property to Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 
12 OKLA. CITY UL. REv. 279 (1987); Judith Schenck Koftler, The Bankruptcy Clause and 
Exemption Laws: A Reexamination of the DoctTine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. 
L. REv. 22 (1983); Alan N. Resnick, Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of 
Nonexempt Assets to Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31 
RUTGERS L. REv. 615 (1978); Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 
YALE L.J. 1459 (1959). 
223. See Border v. McDaniel (In re McDaniel II), 70 F.3d 841, 843 (5th Cir. 1995) 
("[W]e must uphold and enforce the Texas homestead laws even though in so doing we 
might unwittingly-or even knowingly but powerless to avoid it-'assist a dishonest 
debtor in wrongfully defeating his creditor.' This may account for the oft-repeated credi-
tor's lament: 'Debtors either die or move to Texas.' ") (footnote omitted). 
224. See Norwest Bank Neb. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 872 (8th Cir. 1988) ("As part of 
his pre-bankruptcy planning, [the debtor] liquidated almost all of his non-exempt prop-
erty, converting it into exempt property worth approximately $700,000."). 
225. For example, Congress considered an amendment to section 522 to limit the 
homestead exemption to $500,000 in the Bankruptcy Technical Amendments Act of 
1996, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. SB1559. While the Act passed the Senate, it did not come 
up for a vote in the House. 
226. See Davis v. Davis (In re Davis), 170 B.R. 892, 898 (N.D. Tex. 1994) ("Texas 
could provide a remedy by limiting the amount of homestead equity available for exemp-
tion by a debtor. Congress could also provide a remedy by affirmatively limiting state ex-
emptions available under § 522(b)(2). But this court must apply the statutes as it finds 
them.") 
227. Cf., First Tex. Savings Ass'n v. Reed (In re Reed), 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983), 
in which the court acknowledged that state law allows debtors to convert non-exempt 
property into exempt property before filing for bankruptcy. The court stressed, however, 
that federal law determined whether the debtor was entitled to a bankruptcy discharge 
because the Code, not state law, "sets separate standards for determining whether the 
680 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
even if courts feel that debtors are openly "abusing" the Code by 
exempting lavish (and thus, non-necessary) items, they should 
not substitute their policy determination for the determination 
Congress already has made. 
Courts should not attempt to judicially repeal unambiguous 
state exemption statutes to prevent debtors from making non-
necessary lifestyle choices. When courts must apply state ex-
emption statutes that have no monetary limitations, they fre-
quently rely on vague, imprecise, subjective concepts like "good 
faith" or "abuse" to prevent debtors from exempting expensive 
property. Relying on these terms causes courts to reach widely 
varying conclusions concerning a debtor's right to engage in pre-
filing exemption planning. Two cases, issued by the Eighth Cir-
cuit on the same day, present strikingly inconsistent analyses of 
a debtor's right to engage in pre-bankruptcy exemption 
planning. · 
The Chapter 11 debtor (a doctor) in Norwest Bank Nebraska 
v. Tveten228 converted non-exempt property (worth approximately 
$700,000) to exempt property immediately before he filed his 
bankruptcy petition. The debtor admitted that, on advice of 
counsel, he converted the property solely to shield those assets 
from creditors.229 The Eighth Circuit agreed with the lower 
courts' finding that the debtor's behavior was an abuse of bank-
ruptcy laws, and, accordingly, refused to grant the debtor a 
discharge. · 
The Chapter 7 debtors (farmers) in Hanson v. First Nat'l 
Bank in Brookings,230 also engaged in pre-filing exemption plan-
ning. They also converted non-exempt property (worth approxi-
mately $31,000) to exempt property immediately before filing. It 
also appeared that they converted the property on the advice of 
counsel, as they admitted that they were attempting to preserve 
their state law exemptions.231 On the same day it concluded that 
the doctor in Norwest Bank would not receive a discharge, the 
Eighth Circuit concluded that the farmers could keep the ex-
empt property and would received a discharge. 
debtor shall be denied a discharge." Id. at 991. Because the court found that there was 
"evidence of actual intent to defraud creditors" and that the debtor failed to explain sat-
isfactorily why the nonexempt-assets were sold at less than fair market value, the court 
denied the discharge. Id. 
228. 848 E2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988). 
229. See id. at 873. 
230. 848 E2d 866 (8th Cir. 1988). 
231. See id. at 867. 
~ 
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The majority opinions ignore the apparent inconsistency of 
affirming two opinions, posing virtually identical fact patterns, 
where one court found fraud but the other did not. The only no-
ticeable differences between the two cases were the state's ex-
emption laws, the amount of property the debtors converted, 
and the debtors' occupations. The majority opinions claim that 
they did not base their judgments on these differences. Instead, 
the majorities purport to base their decision to allow the farm-
ers to exempt the property, but deny the doctor the same right, 
on a procedural technicality. The standard Qf review for the 
lower courts' findings of fact was clearly erroneous. Because the 
majority concluded that neither lower court's findings was 
clearly erroneous, both cases were affirmed even though the con-
clusions the decisions reached were inconsistent. 
Despite the Eighth Circuit's contention that it relied solely 
on the standard of review, the majority opinions seemed to be 
influenced by the factual differences (state law, amount of con-
verted property, debtors' occupations) in the two cases. These 
differences clearly are irrelevant for bankruptcy purposes as the 
Code allows all debtors-regardless of their socio-economic sta-
tus or the amount of their claimed exemptions-to rely on their 
state statutory exemptions. In fact, the judge who concurred in 
Hanson and dissented in Norwest Bank refers to the differences 
as plainly immaterial and legally irrelevant232 and criticizes the 
majority opinions for failing to explain why they agreed that the 
doctor committed fraud, but the farmers did not. Moreover, this 
judge expressed concern about the guidance (or lack thereof) 
these two opinions gave litigants and lower courts. The concur-
rence argues that the majority's analysis in Hanson "is not a 
rule of law" but, instead, is a "license to make distinctions 
among debtors based on subjective considerations that will vary 
more widely than the length of the chancellor's foot"233 and char-
acterizes the opinion in Norwest Bank as one that "leaves the 
distinction between permissible and impermissible. claims of ex-
emption to· each bankruptcy judge's own sense of proportion."234 
Allowing debtors to shield expensive property economically 
harms creditors, obviously is not consistent with debt repay-
ment, 235 and appears to abuse the spirit of bankruptcy policy. 
232. See id. at 870. 
233. Id. at 871. 
234. 848 F.2d at 879. 
235. The Chapter 7 Trustee uses only non-exempt property to pay creditor claims 
and must pay expenses and claims in a specified order. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 704(1) & 
726 (1994). If the debtor does not have non-exempt, unencumbered assets sufficient to 
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Notwithstanding this appearance, the exemption scheme clearly 
is consistent with the fresh start state legislatures have decided 
to give their citizens via unambiguous exemption statutes. As 
long as Congress has made the policy determination that debt-
ors may rely on state exemption statutes, courts should not at-
tempt to erode that policy determination by hampering a debt-
ors' efforts to take full advant~ge of those statutes.236 Moreover, 
any effort to judicially repeal an otherwise unambiguous statute 
creates uncertainty and increased costs for both debtors and 
creditors since neither party would know which court would in-
terpret the statute as written and which would engraft a good 
faith requirement onto the statute. 
While courts often attempt to prevent debtors from exempt-
ing substantial parcels of real estate, they essentially have ig-
nored smaller luxury items as long as the item falls within a 
category of items that can be claimed as exempt under state 
law. Rather than making a distinction between smaller versus 
larger items, courts should make a distinction between ambigu-
ous versus unambiguous exemption statutes. If the statute is 
unambiguous, debtors should be allowed to exempt both large 
and small pieces of property, whether necessary or not. In con-
trast, if a debtor relies on an ambiguous state exemption statute 
to exempt non-necessary property, the court should construe the 
statute in a manner that limits the exemption to only necessary 
items.237 
pay all claims, each class of creditors will receive a pro rata share of the assets. 11 
U.S.C. § 726(b) (1994). In "no-asset" Chapter 7 cases, unsecured creditors receive noth-
ing. See Flygare v. Boulden, 709 F.2d 1344, 1347 (lOth Cir. 1983). Even if there are no 
non-exempt assets, the Chapter 7 debtor will receive a permanent discharge of all non-
dischargeable pre-petition debts. Once the Chapter 7 debtor receives a discharge, her 
pre-petition creditors can never collect those discharged claims unless the debtor agrees 
to repay (i.e., reaffirm) the debts. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) & (c) (1994). 
236. Again, it is not the purpose of this Article to determine whether Congress 
should allow debtors to rely on unrestricted state exemption schemes. Instead, I suggest 
that unless and until Congress unequivocally states that pre-filing conversions are not 
allowed in bankruptcy, courts should interpret the Code-as written--even though this 
may permit some debtors to avoid paying their debts. 
237. Courts liberally construe state exemption statutes in the debtor's favor. See, 
e.g., Border v. McDaniel (In re McDaniel m, 70 F.3d 841, 843 (5th Cir. 1995) (interpret-
ing Texas law); In re Geise, 992 F.2d 651, 656 (7th Cir. 1993) (interpreting Wisconsin 
law). Notwithstanding "this general principle of liberal construction," courts should not 
rely on this principle to "write exemptions into statutes." In re Geise, 992 F.2d at 656. If 
an exemption statute might be interpreted either favorably or unfavorably vis-a-vis the 
debtor, courts should interpret the statute in a manner that favors the debtor's right 
only to exempt economically necessary items. Cf. In re Barker, 768 F.2d 191, 196 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (interpreting Illinois law in manner that favors debtor without regard to 
bankruptcy policies). 
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The court in In re Perry238 had the opportunity-but re-
fused-to narrowly construe an exemption to prevent a debtor 
from keeping a mink coat. The debtor in Perry exempted prop-
erty under a state exemption law which, at that time, permitted 
debtors to exempt "[a]ll necessary wearing apparel."239 While 
some provisions in that exemption statute contained monetary 
caps on the value of property a debtor could exempt, there was 
no cap for wearing apparel.240 Because of this, the debtor 
claimed that a $2,500 mink coat was "necessary" wearing ap-
parel. Although the express language of the exemption statute 
protected only "necessary" apparel, the court steadfastly refused 
to decide whether a mink was "necessary." 
Acknowledging that the use of the term "necessary" might 
suggest that it is "a word of limitation requiring the fixing of a 
value upon the coat in question as a· criteria in determining its 
exempt status," the court nevertheless permitted the choice be-
cause it found that there was "no question of a good faith claim" 
that coats are necessary items of clothing. 241 While the court cor-
rectly noted that the state legislature easily could have placed a 
monetary cap on the value of "necessary" wearing apparel,242 the 
court just as easily could have denied the debtor's attempt to re-
tain an obvious luxury item. For some reason, however, the 
court would not state that, while coats are necessary, mink 
coats are not. Rather than interpreting the exemption statute to 
allow only those exemptions that protect a debtor's right to a 
fresh (you get a warm coat), not a head (you don't get a mink) 
start, the court abdicated its responsibility to protect creditor's 
rights-and the integrity of the bankruptcy process. 
The court's analysis in In re Lyall243 is equally puzzling. 
There, the debtor relied on an exemption statute that allows 
debtors to exempt a motor vehicle not exceeding $10,000 in 
value which is necessary for use in the course of the debtor's oc-
cupation or trade.244 The debtor sought to exempt an Acura Leg-
end automobile. The Chapter 13 Trustee conceded that the 
238. 6 B.R. 263 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980). 
239. Id. at 264 .. The Vll'ginia General Assembly has since amended sections 34-26 to 
limit the value of wearing apparel a debtor may exempt to $1,000. VA. CoDE ANN. § 34-
26 (Michie 1996). 
240. When the court decided Perry, the following monetary caps existed: value of a 
clothes dryer ($150); value of provisions ($50); value of fowl ($25); value of hay ($25); 
value of a fisherman's boat and tackle ($1500). In re Perry, 6 B.R. at 264. 
241. Id. at 264-65. 
242. See id. at 264. 
243. 193 B.R. 767 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996). 
244. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 34-26(7) (Michie 1996). 
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value of the Acura did not exceed $10,000, but argued that a 
luxury car like an Acura was not necessary to the debtor's occu· 
pation as an architect. Like the court in Perry, the Lyall district 
court refused to decide whether a seemingly luxury item is "nee· 
essary," even though the express language of the state exemp· 
tion statute permitted debtors to exempt only necessary automo· 
biles. Rather than interpreting the statute in a way that 
prevented the debtor from keeping what appeared to be a lux· 
ury item, the court stated that "an inquiry into whether the ve· 
hicle is a luxury automobile is unnecessary when the net fair 
market value is established to be under $10,000."245 Because the 
court was unwilling to state that an automobile is necessary, 
but a luxury car like an Acura may not be, the court again abdi· 
cated its duty to protect creditor's rights-and the integrity of 
the bankruptcy process.246 
If an exemption statute uses a limiting word like "neces· 
sary"247 and the Trustee or a creditor objects to the exemption, 
courts have a right and, more importantly, a duty to decide 
whether the specific item claimed as exempt is necessary. Courts 
should not permit debtors to exempt a luxury item merely be· 
cause it is included in a category of items deemed to be neces· 
sary. Instead, if the court concludes that the item claimed as ex· 
empt is necessary, but that the quality or cost of the particular 
type of the item is not, it should force the debtor to sacrifice the 
non·necessary item. 
If, however, denying the exemption will not yield an eco· 
nomic benefit to the creditor, then the lifestyle choice should be 
permitted even if the choice is non·necessary. For example, if the 
245. In re Lyall, 193 B.R. at 769. 
246. In contrast, the judge in In re Erwin, 199 B.R. 628 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996), re-
fused to allow the debtor to exempt a 1988 Ford Crown Victoria LTD as a tool of the 
trade. The court distinguished between a debtor's need to have access to a car, and the 
debtor's need to have that particular car: "this car is not 'necessary' to his alleged 
trade-any car would be adequate." Id. at 631. See also In re Weinstein, 192 B.R. 133 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (emphasizing that the word "necessary" prevented the debtor 
from exempting a pickup truck). 
247. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE§ 703.140(E) (West Supp. 1997) (allowing debtor 
to keep alimony, stock bonus, payment on account of wrongful death, and payment 
under a life insurance contract to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the 
debtor); GA. CoDE ANN. § 44-13-100 (Supp. 1997) (allowing debtor to keep alimony pay-
ments, pension benefits, and IRA benefits to the extent reasonably necessary for the 
support of the debtor); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31 § 1 (West 1991) (allowing debtor to keep 
implements of husbandry necessary to farm the homestead); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAw 
§ 282 (McKinney 1990) (allowing debtor to keep payment on account of wrongful death 
or payment in compensation for loss of future earnings to the extent reasonably neces-
sary for the support of the debtor). 
1997] THE ROLE OF CHOICE 685 
cost to purchase a necessary car/coat is equal to or greater than 
the money the debtor would receive if he sold the Acura/mink, 
then creditors would not benefit from the sale. In such a case, 
the debtor should be allowed to keep the non-necessary property. 
In contrast, if the debtor can sell the Acura/mink, purchase a re-
placement car/coat and still have proceeds remaining from the 
sale to satisfy creditors' claims, then the debtor should be forced 
to sell the non-necessary property. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress and the courts must find a more consistent way to 
address lifestyle issues. Courts' sporadic treatment of these is-
sues has led them to prevent debtors from making choices per-
mitted by the Code, simply because the court dislikes the partic-
ular choice. Likewise, courts have allowed debtors to make 
choices that economically prejudice creditors even though those 
choices are not necessary or yield no tangible, economic benefits 
to the debtor. 
Preventing debtors from making economically non-necessary 
choices would not force courts to become inappropriately judg-
mental because the courts' primary focus would be to limit the 
economic impact of the choice on creditors.248 Moreover, to the 
extent that the courts' conclusion appears judgmental, this 
would not be inappropriate. Courts quite appropriately judge a 
debtor's post-petition lifestyle because the debtor incurred debt, 
chose not to repay the debt, 249 then chose (at least with respect 
to most cases)250 to file for bankruptcy. By inviting the bank-
248. The lifestyle choices courts should disallow are not core public values that 
should be protected at all costs. As such, there should be little disruption to the overall 
statutory bankruptcy scheme or to the moral growth of our society if these choices are 
disallowed. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 
137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007, 1015 (1989) ("[T]here are at least some values, like the anti-seg-
regation principle, that have worth and contribute to the moral growth of our society."). 
249. See SULLIVAN, ET AL., supra note 24, at 7: 
[B]eing in financial trouble does not always lead to bankruptcy. If Joe, Jean, 
and Julius are all in deep financial trouble. Joe may go bankrupt, Jean may 
struggle to pay, and Julius may skip town. From one perspective, it can be said 
that Joe's bankruptcy was "caused" by his unwillingness to struggle as hard as 
Jean or to sneak out of town like Julius. 
250. The overwhelming majority of bankruptcy filings are debtor-initiated. For ex-
ample, in the year ending June 30, 1994, the total number of voluntary petitions .filed in 
this country was 844,087. For the same period, only 1,170 involuntary petitions were 
filed. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL .ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1995, at 553 (115th ed. 1995). In the Eastern District of Vu-ginia, Norfolk 
Division, 6,843 petitions were filed in 1995. Only three were involuntary' petitions. Inter-
view with Debera Conlon, Assistant U.S. Trustee, E.D. Va. (Dec. 13, 1996). 
686 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
ruptcy court into her life via filing a bankruptcy petition, the 
debtor should expect her life and lifestyle to be scrutinized and 
·should not be surprised when she is told to sacrifice economi-
cally non-necessary choices. While courts should protect a 
debtor's right to discharge most debts and proceed to a fresh 
start in life, bankruptcy must have social consequences and 
courts must make debtors engage in a bit of "good, old-fashioned 
belt tightening."251 
251. In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 128 (6th Cir. 1989) 
